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REGULATION IN THE SHADOWS OF PRIVATE 
LAW 
PAMMELA S. QUINN* 
ABSTRACT 
With proponents of deregulation ascendant, both domestically and 
around the world, private regulation appears to be an attractive solution to 
a seemingly intractable problem—assuming it is or can be effective. This 
Article adds an important corrective to standard accounts of private legal 
regulation and its effectiveness. 
Existing scholarship generally looks to the formal contract terms as the 
key to understanding private regulation and to evaluating its impact. This 
practice needs to be rethought. The relationship between contracting parties, 
as well as the regulatory authority that one party exerts over the other, can 
be quite different than the relationship described by the formal contract 
terms. This Article illustrates the problem with the scholarly assumption that 
formal contract language reliably describes the private regulatory 
relationships they establish. It does so through an in-depth analysis of a form 
of private contracting with great regulatory potential: the loan guarantees 
and associated political risk insurance policies underwritten by the World 
Bank. 
Such policies are purchased by corporations to mitigate the risks 
associated with doing business in under-regulated jurisdictions. Because, on 
their face, the terms of these policies require socially responsible corporate 
behavior, they appear to be a promising form of private regulation, 
succeeding in imposing significant obligations on corporations that 
traditional public regulation has failed to mandate. But these formal terms 
reveal little about the true nature of the private regulatory relationships they 
create. Even though the policy terms themselves are unlikely ever to be 
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formally enforced, the policyholders often have significant incentives to go 
above and beyond the contract requirements if requested to do so by the 
underwriter. But whether they are in fact being asked to do so, and whether 
they are in fact complying if they are being asked, is unclear. 
The World Bank provides considerable transparency surrounding the 
terms of its policies and the process for obtaining them. However, little 
information is available regarding its post-contracting interactions with 
policyholder corporations. Providing data about these interactions could be 
done relatively easily and without infringing upon the confidentiality 
interests that it, and its policyholders, may have. To the extent that entities 
like the World Bank are serious about their corporate social responsibility 
policies, it is imperative that information about the actual contracting 
relationship—and not just the formal contract terms—be made available. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It seems we all too frequently read stories of a building collapsing, a 
mass suicide, child labor abuse, or a report of inhumane working conditions 
at factories connected with multinational corporations such as Samsung, 
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Apple, Wal-Mart, and the Gap.1 So too do we see recurring headlines 
documenting attacks targeting corporate interests abroad.2  
There is reason to be concerned that we will continue to see tragic 
headlines. Regulating multinational business enterprises that operate in 
developing countries has proved challenging.3 It is no accident that these 
tragedies typically occur in jurisdictions without strong domestic legal 
protections that would encourage large multinationals to create humane 
working conditions, do business only with suppliers who do not abuse their 
employees, and take steps to minimize negative impacts of their operations 
on the environment and on local communities.4 
The failure of traditional public lawmaking to regulate multinationals 
and compel socially responsible practices has led to a search for alternative 
forms of regulation.5 Recently there has been a surge in scholarly interest in 
 
 1.  See Julfikar Ali Manik & Jim Yardley, Building Collapse in Bangladesh Leaves Scores Dead, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/world/asia/bangladesh-building-
collapse.html?_r=0; David Barboza, After Suicides, Scrutiny of China’s Grim Factories, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/business/global/07suicide.html; Jeff Stone, 
Samsung Child Labor: Ask Apple or Wal-Mart, Corporate Human Rights Violations Are Nothing New, 
INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 11, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.com/samsung-child-labor-ask-apple-wal-mart-
corporate-human-rights-violations-are-nothing-new-1625870; Richard Bilton, Apple Failing to Protect 
Workers, BBC PANORAMA (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-30532463. 
 2.  See Dan Molinski, Colombian Rebels’ Attacks Set Back Nation, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 7, 
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/colombian-rebel-attacks-set-back-nation-1415399080 (reporting that 
Colombian rebels have ramped up attacks on the pipeline and disrupted large oil companies such as 
ExxonMobil and Occidental Petroleum); see also infra Part II, at 17–21 (documenting a coup d’etat in 
Madagascar sparked by anti-FDI sentiment and culminating in a new government which cancelled major 
contracts including a plan by “the South Korean industrial conglomerate, Daewoo, to take out a 99-year 
lease for over 1.3 million hectares of arable land” to grow corn to export back to South Korea). 
 3.  See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through 
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
501, 504–05 (2009) (“In addition, the evolving structures of global production—multinational enterprises 
and global supply chains—pose major challenges for conventional ‘regulation’.”) (footnote omitted); 
Charles Sabel et al., Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the Global 
Workplace 4 (Colum. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Paper Grp., Paper No. 21, 2000), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 262178 (“Transformations in the global economy 
have outpaced traditional labor laws and regulatory institutions. . . Partly as a consequence, the present 
wave of globalization has given rise to widespread abuses . . . .”). 
 4.  See, e.g., Ilias Bantekas, Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 22 B.U. INT’L 
L. REV. 309, 345–46 (2008); see also John Ruggie, (U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative for 
Business and Human Rights), Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue 
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” 
Framework, U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011). 
 5.  See, e.g., Bantekas, supra note 4, at 310–11; see also Caroline Rees, Treaties and the U.N. 
Guiding Principles on Human Rights: A Way Forward, CSRWIRE (July 7, 2014, 9:07 AM), 
http://www.csrwire.com/blog/posts/1417-treaties-the-un-guiding-principles-on-business-human-rights-
the-way-forward (describing debate between a multilateral treaty vs. soft law approach to CSR). 
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the potential of private regulation to fill these significant regulatory gaps.6 
For example, a new but rapidly growing literature explores the possibility 
that better corporate practices may be produced through global value chains 
that are governed by contracts between buyers and suppliers.7 Another major 
strand of recent scholarship examines the ways that private actors use 
contracts to supplement the public regulatory function, including with 
respect to setting, implementing, and enforcing standards.8 
This increasingly dense literature presents private regulation via 
contracting as a promising alternative to traditional public regulation.9 In 
general, private regulation has been pitched as a particularly exciting option 
in contexts where the challenges associated with public regulation are at their 
apex—as they are with respect to transnational business ventures operating 
in developing countries that lack mature or well-functioning legal systems.10 
Even in more mature and developed systems, current political movements to 
dismantle public regulation make the issue particularly timely and 
significant.11 
When analyzing private regulation by contract, scholars typically 
presume that the terms of the private regulatory relationship can be gleaned 
from the language of the contract documents. This focus on formal contract 
terms appears intuitive—at least at first blush.  Given the importance of the 
 
 6.  See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of 
Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739 (2007). This same 
interest in private regulatory potential has been the recent subject of environmental law scholars as well. 
See, e.g., Michael Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (2013). 
 7.  See, e.g., Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747 
(2014). 
 8.  See, e.g., Michael Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 
2033 (2007) (“First, the firm subject to first-order regulation [from the public regulator] often enters into 
second-order agreements with other private actors. These agreements then influence the incentives of the 
regulated firm and induce the other contracting parties to have an interest in the regulatory scheme.”). See 
generally Symposium, The Duke Project on Custom and Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 529 (2012); Symposium, 
New Forms of Governance: Ceding Power to Private Actors, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (2002); 
Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Symposium, 
Thirty-Third Annual Administrative Law Issue: Agencies, Economic Justice, and Private Initiatives, 53 
DUKE L.J. 291 (2003). 
 9.  See, e.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 8, at 2033. 
 10.  See, e.g., Fabrizio Cafaggi, New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J. L. & 
SOC. 20, 23 (2011). 
 11.  See, e.g., Thomas Franck, While Big Bills Have Failed, Wall Street Sees Opportunity in 
Trump’s Massive Deregulation Movement, CNBC (Aug. 5, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/04/wall-street-sees-opportunity-in-trumps-massive-deregulation-
movement.html (describing Republicans’ 2017 agenda as “what may likely be the most massive 
deregulation effort the nation has ever seen”); see also TSUYOSHI OYAMA, DELOITTE, 2017 GLOBAL RISK 
OUTLOOK (describing how “new American and British governments [following the election of Donald 
Trump in the U.S. and the success of the “Brexit” vote in the U.K.] are drastically changing th[e previous] 
trend of greater regulatory controls”).  
QUINN FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2018  8:31 PM 
2018] REGULATION IN THE SHADOW OF PRIVATE LAW 331 
text in understanding and analyzing public rules, it makes sense that 
researchers analogizing to the public regulatory context might consider the 
formal contract language.12 Furthermore, legal scholars generally prefer to 
examine written documents. Even if they are not always clear, written 
contracts are less time-consuming to interpret as compared with piecing 
together information from oral or outside sources—as some of contract law’s 
most basic principles reflect.13  While oral contracts are permitted in many 
situations, a written contract is sometimes required.14 Even when not 
required, it is generally preferable.15 
Yet, although a contract brings a private regulatory relationship into 
existence, it does not necessarily dictate how it will develop. Once their 
relationship has commenced, contracting parties may or may not follow the 
terms they established at the outset. They may never even intend to do so. 
So too may the regulatory behavior of the parties to the contract play 
out very differently than the formal terms suggest that it should.  An example 
from the multinational context demonstrates how private regulation can 
work differently in practice than on paper. Given the intense scholarly 
interest in private regulatory solutions to the problems inherent in 
multinational business ventures, it is surprising that so little attention has 
been paid to the regulatory potential of contracts involved in guaranteeing 
foreign direct investment. If imposing obligations by contract is indeed a 
viable way of regulating transnational actors, we might expect to find these 
obligations written into contracts entered into by corporations when they 
 
 12.  See, e.g., Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“The starting point in discerning 
congressional intent is the existing statutory text . . . ‘[‘W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole 
function of the courts . . . is to enforce it according to its terms.’” (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. 
v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)). 
 13.  See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 608 (1944) (noting 
that the parol evidence rule, not admitting evidence of oral contract modifications, derives from “[t]he 
belief that oral testimony varying or contradicting a written instrument is likely to be false or mistaken”).  
 14.  See, e.g., Emerson v. Slater, 63 U.S. 28, 41 (1859) (“Verbal agreements between the parties to 
a written contract, made before or at the time of the execution of the contract, are in general inadmissible 
to vary its terms, or to affect its construction. All such verbal agreements are considered as merged in the 
written contract.”); Grant v. Naylor, 8 U.S. 224, 235 (1808) (“[A] promise to pay the debt of another shall 
be in writing, and which will not permit a written contract to be explained by parol testimony, originate 
in a general and a wise policy, which this court cannot relax so far as to except from its operation cases 
within the principles.”); see also U.C.C. § 22-201 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) 
(imposing a writing requirement on the sale of goods above $500). 
 15.  Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Contractual Obligations Created Equal?, 100 
GEO. L.J. 5, 42 (2011) (discussing benefits of contracts that contain terms reducing uncertainty and the 
tendency of parties to draft very specific contract provisions to ensure certainty); cf. Timothy Meyer, 
Power, Exit Costs and Renegotiation in International Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 379, 392 (2010). 
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undertake cross-border investment projects and seek loan guarantees and 
insurance.16 
As it turns out, some of these contracts do contain regulatory provisions. 
For example, contracts into which corporations enter to obtain loan 
guarantees and insure against political risks17 inherent to investment projects 
in developing countries typically require them to undertake local 
philanthropic projects and to engage in environmentally sustainable 
practices beyond what is required by public law in the relevant 
jurisdictions.18 Such contract provisions are direct evidence of private law’s 
potential to regulate transnational corporate behavior where public law has 
failed to do so.19 
Contract terms promoting socially responsible business practices are 
now standard. Intergovernmental and governmental agencies—including the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), an affiliate of the World 
Bank—and the credit and investment guarantee agencies that are MIGA’s 
domestic counterparts20—have developed detailed model agreements and 
provisions that mandate investors with whom they contract to undertake to 
comply with Environmental and Social Performance Standards (“ESP 
Standards”) tailored to the guaranteed or insured investment that is the 
subject of the guarantee.21 In short, these contracts purport to regulate 
 
 16.  See, e.g., Bantekas, supra note 4, at 311; Korinna Horta, Rhetoric and Reality: Human Rights 
and the World Bank, 15 HARV. H.R. J. 227, 235–36 (2002). 
 17.  In its “Glossary of Terms Used in the Political Risk Insurance Industry,” the World Bank 
Group’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Fund (MIGA) defines “political risk” to be those “associated 
with government actions which deny or restrict the right of an investor/owner i) to use or benefit from 
his/her assets; or ii) which reduce the value of the firm.” MIGA, GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN THE 
POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE INDUSTRY 1.  The definition also specifically identifies the following as 
political risks: “war, revolutions, government seizure of property and actions to restrict the movement of 
profits or other revenues from within a country.” Id.  
  The type of government in place is relevant to the level of political risk. See Nathan Jensen, 
Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment, 70 J. POL. 1040 (2008) (The 
existence of “democratic institutions lead to lower levels of [political] risk” because of “the constraints 
placed on executives in democratic regimes.”). 
 18.  Bantekas, supra note 4, at 330. 
 19.  Cf. Vandenbergh, supra note 8, at 2045–62. I am using the phrase “private law” to mean 
obligations that are incurred in voluntary transactions even if they are in contracts with public or quasi-
public entities. That is, I meant it in contrast to the phrase “public law,” by which I mean laws or 
regulations enacted by governmental entities and imposed on their subjects. 
 20.  As of 2005, there were seventy-six export credit agencies operating in sixty-two countries. 
ROGER MOODY, THE RISKS WE RUN: MINING, COMMUNITIES, AND POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE 15 
(2005). 
 21.  Projects: Performance Standards, MIGA, https://www.miga.org/projects/environmental-and-
social-sustainability/performance-standards (last visited Sept. 18, 2017); see e.g., Project Brief, Grand 
Hotel du Louvre, SA, MIGA, https://www.miga.org/pages/projects/project.aspx?pid=680 (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2017). 
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policyholders’ conduct in ways that host countries have failed to do through 
public lawmaking. MIGA trumpets this development in its contracting 
practices as strong evidence of its support for socially responsible practices 
by multinational corporations.22 
Yet, critics dismiss the ESP Standards embedded in these contracts as 
political window dressing that bogs down the efficiency of the market.23 The 
assertion that ESP Standards have no real impact is supported by the weak 
enforcement mechanisms connected to these Standards, which rely mainly 
on self-reporting by investors as proof of compliance.24 And even if non-
compliance were uncovered, it likely would not constitute a material breach 
that would result in the non-payment of a claim, thereby eliminating any 
direct financial consequences as a motivating threat to promote 
compliance.25 Not to mention that formal claims are almost never made, 
thereby virtually ensuring the ESP Standards will never be the subject of any 
formal enforcement action.26 
But this contemptuous assessment of the regulatory influence of the 
ESP Standards is not necessarily accurate.27 This critical account is based 
solely on the formal contract terms—and the fact that the formal rights they 
create are rarely invoked. Critics assume that we can discern the regulatory 
impact of the contract based upon whether it incentivizes policyholders to 
comply with their contractual obligations to undertake socially responsible 
conduct. 
In fact, it is true that MIGA does not engage in traditional enforcement 
of its insurance policy terms, including the ESP Standards. It never cancels 
policies nor has it ever tried to deny any of the few claims that have been 
brought. Yet, the reason why these contract provisions are never formally 
enforced is precisely because MIGA is in a position to act as an extremely 
strong regulator of its policyholders. As discussed in great detail later, claims 
are never brought because MIGA is arguably not providing “insurance” in 
the sense that we typically understand that term—or in accordance with the 
 
 22.  Projects: Performance Standards, supra note 21 (“These Performance Standards help MIGA 
and its clients manage and improve social and environmental performance through an outcomes-based 
approach.”). 
 23.  Keith Rosenblum, Terrifying Insurance, 6 DEV. ASIA 32, 32–35 (2010). 
 24.  Horta, supra note 16, at 228. 
 25.  See infra note 140 & accompanying text (discussing the fact that MIGA has never denied a 
claim). 
 26.  See infra note 140 & accompanying text (discussing the fact that MIGA has only had eight 
claims in its entire history). 
 27.  In general, analyses of political risk insurance tend to reach polar opposite conclusions and it 
can be hard to determine which side is more accurate given the lack of data available. See VIRGINIA 
HAUFLER, DANGEROUS COMMERCE: INSURANCE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RISK 41 
(1997). 
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formal terms of its own policies. Instead, by establishing contractual 
relationships that are tied to its policyholders’ investments, it actually 
provides services as an enforcer of the investor’s property rights within the 
host country and/or, alternatively, as a powerful mediator when disputes 
related to the insured investments arise. 
Because these services are immensely valuable to the policyholders, 
MIGA has the power to wield enormous influence over them—as well as 
over the host governments of the countries in which they are invested (in 
large part because they are also generally recipients of loans and aid provided 
by other arms of the World Bank and thus eager to remain on good terms). 
Far less clear is whether MIGA actually exercises its regulatory authority by 
demanding strict compliance with the ESP Standards (or by imposing 
additional obligations in addition to the Standards). While MIGA is 
extremely transparent when it comes to information about its policies and 
the process for obtaining them, it provides very little information about the 
real product it is selling, namely, its post-contract services as an 
enforcer/mediator. Thus, whether and how it is choosing to regulate its 
policyholders’ behavior is difficult to discern given the lack of available data. 
This Article is the first to investigate the potential for private contract 
relationships to exert strong regulatory influence over transnational 
corporate policies and practices beyond the four corners of the contract 
documents. This project will attempt to develop a more nuanced account of 
private regulation that is created by contracting relationships, but is not 
necessarily elucidated by the formal terms of the contracts themselves. The 
goals of the project are (1) to provide a descriptive account of these 
regulatory relationships that is more complete, accurate, and nuanced than 
the current accounts; and (2) to develop a methodology to study these 
contractual relationships in a more meaningful way than can be done by 
looking solely at the formal contract documents. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I summarizes the existing 
scholarly literature on private regulation. Part II describes a potential form 
of private regulation: contracts associated with loan guarantees and political 
risk insurance policies that contain lengthy and detailed provisions requiring 
compliance with corporate social responsibility criteria. Part III then 
describes how these contracts work in practice and demonstrates that the 
formal contract terms do not describe the true nature of the regulatory 
relationships they create. 
While one can guess at the contours of those relationships from some 
of the information that MIGA makes publicly available, their true nature, and 
the extent to which regulatory authority is actually being wielded—and in 
what ways—is not clear. Part IV describes the current data collection and 
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disclosure undertaken by MIGA and concludes that more transparency is 
essential to fully understand the regulatory relationship between MIGA and 
its policyholders. The Article concludes that, while studying an extra-
contractual approach to private regulation may prove difficult for 
researchers, it is necessary to examine these lived contract relationships 
closely in order to assess the actual and potential regulatory impact of private 
contracting. To that end, the Article creates a path upon which such projects 
could proceed. 
I. PRIVATE REGULATION 
One often thinks of legal regulation generally, and corporate legal 
regulation in particular, as solely or primarily within the ambit of public 
lawmakers. “In particular, political entities, states confined within a 
geographic territory, [have traditionally] had a virtual monopoly over 
economic regulation, each in their own territor[ies].”28 Yet, when 
corporations cross borders and business becomes increasingly trans-national, 
even global, in scope, regulatory efforts become difficult for any one state to 
control.29 As a result, “public law, as either substantive rules or as systems 
of governance, has proven increasingly unable to respond efficiently to the 
problems of the governance of economic relations.”30 The result is that “[a] 
diverse group of actors today vie with national governments for the right to 
exert power and authority. . . . Of these, the modern multinational 
corporation (MNC) is perhaps the most powerful.”31 
A deep scholarly literature describes the regulatory difficulties 
attendant to the cross-border nature of many corporate transactions.32 One 
possible solution that has emerged from this literature is regulation of MNCs 
by one another33 or by other entities, such as insurance companies or public 
 
 28.  Backer, supra note 6, at 1743. 
 29.  Id. at 1745.  
 30.  Id.  
 31.  David Antony Detomasi, The Multinational Corporation and Global Governance: Modelling 
Global Policy Networks, 71 J. BUS. ETHICS 321, 321 (2007); see also Peter J. Spiro, Constraining Global 
Corporate Power, 46 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 1101, 1103 (2013) (“To the extent that states are less able to 
regulate them, then, globalization empowers multinational corporations.”).  
 32.  See, e.g., PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 123–72 (1999); 
Steven Lukes, Five Fables About Human Rights, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS 19 (Stephen Shute & Susan 
Harley eds., 1993); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 
111 YALE L.J. 443, 446 (2001). 
 33.  Spiro, supra note 31, at 1104–09 (describing private regulatory approaches to disciplining 
transnational corporate behavior); Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Transnational Corporations and Public 
Accountability, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 234, 245–57 (2004) (detailing the efforts to regulate 
corporations globally by states, international organizations, NGOs, and corporations themselves); Rhys 
Jenkins, U.N. RES. INST. FOR SOC. DEV., CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT: SELF-REGULATION IN THE 
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entities with whom they enter into private contracts.34 Because these 
relationships are created and structured by contract, scholars typically and 
naturally presume that the terms of the private regulatory relationship can be 
found in the formal contract documents. 
A. The Scholarly Literature on Private Regulation 
A variety of scholars across many fields have challenged the traditional 
public law framework that permeates traditional scholarly analyses of 
regulation.35 These scholars evaluate private law as a potential substitute for, 
or helpmate to, public law in situations “[w]here regulation does not exist (in 
form or fact), or where markets in law break down or are inefficient.”36 Thus, 
scholars study how and when private actors37—including corporations, civil 
society, the media, and individuals—separately and together can create a 
system of rule-making and rule-enforcement that may be more effective than 
public lawmaking (or at least public lawmaking on its own).38 
In many legal subfields, private regulation is a hot topic. Private law 
enforcement by small groups has been a subject of significant scholarly 
interest for at least twenty-five years, since Professor Bob Ellickson 
described the effectiveness of private social norms in influencing the 
behavior of Shasta County cattle ranchers.39 Since then, legal scholars have 
 
GLOBAL ECONOMY,  (Apr. 2001) (describing the historic development of corporate codes); Sean D. 
Murphy, Taking Multinational Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 
389 (2005) (describing emergence of corporate codes of conduct). 
 34.  See, e.g., Ken Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 653, 683 (2013); 
TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE 
UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (2010); Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing 
Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 228 (2012). 
 35.  Backer, supra note 6, at n.15 (citing SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 128–43 (2004); Mitchell F. Crusto, Green Business: Should We Revoke 
Corporate Charters for Environmental Violations?, 63 LA. L. REV. 175, 241 (2003); A.J. Natale, 
Expansion of Parent Corporate Shareholder Liability Through the Good Samaritan Doctrine: A Parent 
Corporation’s Duty to Provide a Safe Workplace for Employees of its Subsidiary, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 717, 
734–36 (1988)). 
 36.  Backer, supra note 6, at 1748. 
 37.  Larry Catá Backer suggests there are four principal actors who function separately and in 
tandem as private regulators: (1) corporations and other enterprises; (2) civil society, primarily economic 
and human rights NGOs; (3) the media; and (4) consumers (of both media and market goods). See id. at 
1748–49. 
 38.  Id.; Spiro, supra note 33, at 1103–06 (“[S]tates often lack regulatory capacity or regulatory 
will.”). But see Ralf Michaels, The Mirage of Non-State Governance, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 31, 33 
(criticizing the notion of “non-state governance” as “conceptually,” “empirically,” and “normatively 
unattractive”). 
 39.  ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 52–64 
(1991). 
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analyzed myriad private groups—from cotton merchants40 to diamond 
traders41 to lobstermen42 and more43—who have been able to develop highly 
successful and efficient cooperative institutions that operate outside of 
traditional public regulatory mechanisms—that is, extra-legally. 
This interest in private regulation has only expanded in recent years.44 
In the environmental law context, for instance, Professor Mike Vandenbergh 
draws from a similar proliferation of interest in private regulation to 
demonstrate that such regulatory “activities, when viewed in the aggregate, 
represent a development in environmental law and governance . . . .”45 He 
contends that “recent empirical research” demonstrates that private 
regulatory initiatives “are having important [beneficial] effects on 
environmental behavior and environmental quality.”46 
Previously, Vandenbergh described one example of the private 
regulation of public law environmental standards: the inclusion of such 
standards in contracts, such as credit agreements and insurance policies.47 He 
noted that credit agreements typically include provisions requiring 
compliance with environmental regulations (and sometimes compliance with 
even stricter standards than those that are already required by law). 
Consequently, “after the loan is entered into, a lender has incentives to ensure 
that its borrower does not violate the law or engage in liability-creating 
behavior if doing so will interfere with repayment of the loan or put the 
lender directly at risk for the liabilities of the borrower.”48 While it is unclear, 
as an empirical matter, how frequently lenders actually insist on influencing 
borrowers to comply (or not) with environmental obligations, “it is clear that 
lenders have incentives to select low-risk borrowers and often have 
 
 40.  Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1745 (2001). 
 41.  Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the 
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions 
Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 383, 
409–13 (2006). 
 42.  See generally, JAMES ACHESON, CAPTURING THE COMMONS: DEVISING INSTITUTIONS TO 
MANAGE THE MAINE LOBSTER INDUSTRY (2003); Pammela Quinn Saunders, A Sea Change Off the Coast 
of Maine: Common Pool Resources as Cultural Property, 60 EMORY L.J. 1323 (2011). 
 43.  See, e.g., Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: Ambiguities of 
Public Authority and Private Power, 76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117 (2013) (lex mercatoria). 
 44.  Perhaps inevitably, it has at the same time provoked a backlash. See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 
38, at 31. 
 45.  Vandenbergh, supra note 6, at 139. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Vandenbergh, supra note 8, at 2030–32. 
 48.  Id. at 2052. “A sample of the credit agreements filed with the SEC suggests that firms filed 
more than 1,500 credit agreements in 2001, and almost 70% of these include environmental provisions.”  
Id. at 2051–52. 
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incentives to demand regulatory compliance or overcompliance during the 
term of the loan. As a result, in many instances lenders have incentives to 
engage in traditionally public regulatory functions, including monitoring and 
enforcement, implementation, standard setting, and dispute resolution.”49 
“Lenders also include provisions in credit agreements that establish their 
right to monitor debtors during the term of the loan and to enforce regulatory 
compliance (e.g., by declaring noncompliance to be a breach of 
representation and an event of default).”50 
Likewise, Vandenbergh reports that “[e]nvironmental insurance 
policies have many of the same effects on the regulatory scheme” as do credit 
and other agreements with environmental compliance provisions.51 For 
instance, “[i]nsurers often vary premiums for firms that can demonstrate 
compliance or overcompliance with environmental regulations.”52 
Significantly, in at least some insurance contexts, Vandenbergh reports, 
there is evidence that “insurers do monitor compliance on an ongoing 
basis.”53 Marine insurance underwriters, for example, “employ marine 
inspectors to survey ships that they are considering insuring” in order to 
ensure that marine environmental risks do not manifest.54 
Other socio-legal scholars have also focused on the ways that insurance 
policy requirements influence actors and organizations that purchase 
insurance.55 Professor Ken Abraham has described how insurance is 
sometimes viewed as “a relationship in which the insurer ‘governs’ its 
policyholders.”56 Under this view of insurance as a form of regulation or 
governance, the insurer effectively functions like a government regulator “by 
influencing policyholders’ conduct.”57 Or, as Abraham succinctly 
 
 49.  Id. at 2053. 
 50.  Id.  
 51.  Id. at 2062–63. 
 52.  Id. at 2063. 
 53.  Id. at 2064. 
 54.  Id. In the marine insurance context, private regulation by insurers has long been noted in 
connection with shipping risks inherent to the international sale of goods. For instance, in order to provide 
coverage of war-related risks in the late nineteenth century, insurers quickly determined that policies 
needed to require that shippers mitigate risk of damages by putting in at the nearest port when a war broke 
out. See HAUFLER, supra note 27, at 47. Multiple other “regulations” have also been written into shipping 
contracts since the nineteenth century. See id. at 41. These may have as much, or more, impact on private 
decision making than any formal set of public rules has had on the shipping industry. 
 55.  See, e.g., Shauhin Talesh, Data Breach, Privacy, and Cyber Insurance: How Insurance 
Companies Act as “Compliance Managers” for Businesses, Law & Soc. Inquiry doi:10.1111/lsi.12303 
(2017), http://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/talesh/Talesh-2017-Law%20and%20Social_Inquiry% 
20Cyber%20Insurance.pdf; BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 34; Abraham, supra note 34; Ben-Shahar & 
Logue, supra note 34. 
 56.  Abraham, supra note 34, at 683.  
 57.  Id. at 684. 
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summarizes it, this conception of insurance views “insurance as a surrogate 
for government.”58 
Diverse scholarly projects have examined insurance through a similar 
lens. They have a common understanding of insurance “as a relationship in 
which the insurer ‘governs’ its policyholders.”59 
Within the insurance law scholarly literature, there are examples of the 
ways that insurance companies exercise control by entering into an insurance 
contract with a potential insured. Thus, insurance companies exercise de 
facto control over, inter alia, who may lawfully drive a car60 or which 
physicians are granted hospital-admitting privileges.61 
Insurance may serve a governance function in other ways as well. 
Professor Shauhin Talesh describes the impact that Employment Practices 
Liability Insurance (EPLI) has had on employers who face the threat of 
employment law litigation.62 Talesh concludes that EPLI has actually done 
far more than simply provide insurance coverage for those who are sued. 
Instead, EPLI has actually ended up “construct[ing] the meaning of 
compliance with antidiscrimination law.”63 Moreover, it has done so in ways 
that may or may not be normatively desirable. Talesh concludes that his 
“data suggest EPLI and the series of risk-management services offered with 
the insurance policy can potentially improve employment practices and 
compliance,” but also “that EPLI risk-management services may at times 
shape compliance in a way that leans more toward making claims defensible 
rather than fostering a discrimination-free workplace.”64 
At the same time as researchers’ interest in regulation via insurance and 
other private contracts has been growing, there has also been a surge of 
scholarly interest within the transnational corporate law and business 
 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 683. 
 60.  Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, Embracing Risk, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING 
CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 13 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, eds. 2002) [hereinafter 
EMBRACING RISK] (noting that because auto insurance plays this role that it “is a form of regulation”). 
 61.  See Carol A. Heimer, Insuring More, Ensuring Less: The Costs and Benefits of Private 
Regulation Through Insurance, in EMBRACING RISK, supra note 60, at 127. That is, because hospitals 
require their physicians to have insurance coverage, medical malpractice insurers ultimately exercise 
complete control over which doctors may practice medicine in the setting where most medical treatment 
occurs. Abraham, supra note 34, at 685 (“[S]ince physicians and others in the medical profession are 
granted hospital-admitting privileges only if they have malpractice insurance, malpractice insurers 
determine which physicians get these privileges. The practical effect is that insurers decide who can 
practice medicine in public and private hospitals, where most medical treatment occurs.”). 
 62.  Shauhin Talesh, Legal Intermediaries: How Insurance Companies Construct the Meaning of 
Compliance with Anti-Discrimination Laws, 37 L. & POL’Y 209, 209–11 (2015). 
 63.  Id. at 211. 
 64.  Id. 
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literatures on the potential of supply chain contracting to serve as an effective 
private regulatory mechanism. This literature focuses on the potential of 
contracts to positively impact the labor conditions that exist within suppliers’ 
factories located in developing economies in which serious human rights 
violations occur with depressing frequency.65 Recent events, such as the 
Rana Plaza tragedy, suggest that dangerous workplace conditions are a real 
threat to vulnerable workers worldwide.66 Scholars have posited that through 
private or public-private regulation of the suppliers, the ultimate end users—
who are typically located in highly-regulated, developed economies—can 
fill the regulatory gaps that currently account for the lack of public legal 
protection of workers and other located at the supplier end of the chain.67 
Whether and how supply chain contracting is or can be a feasible mechanism 
for addressing these public regulatory failures is debatable,68 but it has been 
embraced as a serious alternative in situations where public regulation is 
especially unrealistic.69 
B. The Emphasis on Formal Contract Terms 
While approaching private regulation from numerous angles and via 
various arrangements, what nearly all70 examples of private regulation have 
in common is the existence of some sort of formal contract or written 
document setting forth the terms of the relationship between the regulated 
and regulating parties. Whether it is an insurance policy setting forth contract 
terms regulating the environmental risk exposure of a corporation71 or a 
 
 65.  See, e.g., Backer, supra note 6 (describing Wal-Mart Supply Agreements). 
 66.  See Larry Catá Backer, Are Supply Chains Transnational Legal Orders?: What We Can Learn 
from the Rana Plaza Factory Building Collapse, 1 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L, TRANSNAT’L. & COMP. L. 1 
(2016). 
 67.  See, e.g., Parella, supra note 7, at 815–18 (criticizing current approaches for failing to take into 
account misaligned incentives of suppliers and their multinational buyers and suggesting alternatives that 
incorporate some elements of traditional public legal regulation). 
 68.  See, e.g., RICHARD M. LOCKE, THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER: PROMOTING 
LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2013); cf. Backer, supra note 6; Parella, supra note 7 and 
accompanying text.  
 69.  See, e.g., John G. Ruggie, Commentary: Quo Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and 
Human Rights Treaty Sponsors, INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS (Sept. 9, 2014), 
https://www.ihrb.org/other/treaty-on-business-human-rights/quo-vadis-unsolicited-advice-to-business-
and-human-rights-treaty-sponsors (discussing contentious debate over multilateral treaty on topic of 
business and human rights). See also Larry Catá Backer, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Trends, 
Challenges, and Opportunities, 22 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 1, 3–4 (2015).  
 70.  Obviously informal regulation by private close-knit groups or communities typically involves 
unwritten social norms rather than written contracts. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 39; Saunders, supra 
note 42. Although, even some examples of this type of private regulation involve formal contracts. See, 
e.g., Bernstein, supra note 40 (cotton merchants); Bernstein, supra note 41 (diamond industry). 
 71.  See, e.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 8, at 135–36.  
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contract between a supplier and a distributor or a distributor and a retailer,72 
most of the space in which private regulation may happen occurs within the 
context of a formally negotiated and written agreement.73 Indeed, the 
existence of the contract gives rise to the relationship itself and the power of 
one contracting party over the other within that relationship. 
“The traditional and dominant conception of insurance is that it is a 
contract.”74 Under this contract conception of insurance, the formal terms of 
the policy itself—”[t]he language of an insurance contract”—are typically 
assumed to be the relevant framework for understanding and interpreting the 
relationship established by the policy and the obligations thereby imposed 
on the insured.75 
Even when insurance or other private contracts are conceived as 
regulatory instruments, focusing on the formal contract terms has an intuitive 
appeal. Although the notion of private regulation inherently recasts public 
rules as private ones, it makes sense that researchers who draw analogies 
between public law and private regulation would consider the formal text of 
the rules as a starting point given the importance of the text in understanding 
and analyzing public rules.76 
Doing so is also easier than the alternative. Contracts are tangible 
sources. Legal scholars especially may feel most confident extracting data 
from written documents. The information they contain is far more likely to 
 
 72.  See, e.g., Parella, supra note 7.  
 73.  Of course, not all private contracts are subject to negotiation. Most insurance policies have 
terms drafted by the insurance company with insureds selecting their level of coverage by paying more 
or less depending on what standard terms and/or exclusions are included. Standardized contract terms 
proliferate in the transnational context, where the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) oversees 
the drafting of standard terms. See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce, The Incoterms® Rules, 
https://iccwbo.org/resources-for-business/incoterms-rules/incoterms-rules-2010/ (last visited September 
11, 2017) (“The Incoterms® rules have become an essential part of the daily language of trade. They 
have been incorporated in contracts for the sale of goods worldwide and provide rules and guidance to 
importers, exporters, lawyers, transporters, insurers and students of international trade.”). This is quasi-
public—or completely public, as in the case of the Convention on the International Sale of Goods. U. N. 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.97/18 art. 5 (1981)  [hereinafter CISG]). (https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/ 
treaty.html). And, some private “regulation” happens informally, as in the case of regulation among 
members of close knit groups. See ELLICKSON, supra note 39; see also ACHESON, supra note 42. 
 74.  Abraham, supra note 34, at 658. Abraham notes that conceptualizing insurance relationships in 
contract terms “is the dominant way of understanding insurance for good reason,” as it “is the most 
accurate description of what insurance is.” In addition, and notably, insurance as contract “is also the way 
insurance law most often treats insurance.” Id. 
 75.  Id. at 658–59 (noting that courts and scholars focus primarily on the language of the insurance 
contract). 
 76.  See, e.g., Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004).  
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present a clear story than the information that might be pieced together from 
reconstructing oral agreements or looking to extra-contractual sources.77 
Relying on the contract itself, rather than outside accounts of what was 
intended, reflects a fundamental principle of contract law. Parties are 
sometimes legally required to document their agreements in writing.78 Even 
when oral contracts are legally authorized, a written agreement is preferable 
because it can be consulted years later when memories fade.79 
Despite the inherent challenges, some scholars have recently started 
looking at other factors to better understand the formal relationship. For 
instance, Professor Talesh has contrasted Directors and Officers (“D&O”) 
liability insurance policies, in which scholars have concluded that certain 
inherent structural features of the contracting relationship between insurance 
companies and the directors and officers they are insuring, create 
disincentives against insurers putting in place loss prevention controls that 
would serve an important regulatory function,80 with cyber liability 
insurance, in which insurers typically step in to provide direct management 
in a crisis and ensure appropriate legal responses by their insureds.81 But 
even when, as in this example, a scholar has widened his lens to encompass 
more of the contextual backdrop against which regulation within a 
contractual relationship might happen, the contracts and the formal terms 
they contain are still assumed to set the terms of the relationships.82 
II. POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE AS A POTENTIAL 
REGULATORY VEHICLE 
As described in Part I, insurance law scholars have focused on a number 
of types of policies that might serve to regulate the behavior of insureds. This 
scholarly literature has so far failed to examine a particular type of insurance 
with great potential to exert regulatory influence. Political risk insurance 
 
 77.  See Corbin, supra note 13, at 608. 
 78.  Emerson v. Slater, 63 U.S. 28, 41 (1859) (“Verbal agreements between the parties to a written 
contract, made before or at the time of the execution of the contract, are, in general, inadmissible to vary 
its terms or to affect its construction. All such verbal agreements are considered as merged in the written 
contract.”); Grant v. Naylor, 8 U.S. 224, 235 (1808) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[T]he principles which require that 
a promise to pay the debt of another shall be in writing, and which will not permit a written contract to 
be explained by parol testimony, originate in a general and a wise policy, which this court cannot relax 
so far as to except from its operation cases within the principles.”); see also 2 U.C.C. § 201(1) (AM. LAW 
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (imposing writing requirement on sale of goods above $500). 
 79.  Feldman & Teichman, supra note 15, at 42 (discussing benefits of contracts that contain terms 
reducing uncertainty and tendency of parties to draft very specific contract provisions to ensure certainty); 
cf. Meyer, supra note 15, at 392.  
 80.  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 34, at 60–62. 
 81.  Talesh, supra note 55, at 4. 
 82.  Id. at 16–19. 
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(PRI) is striking in this regard, because it is sought by investors specifically 
when they know they will be operating in environments with low or no 
public regulation. PRI insures against precisely those risks that correlate with 
the instability and unpredictability of traditional public legal protections of 
foreign investments. 
Concerns about a corporate social responsibility deficit are greatest in 
jurisdictions where corporations—particularly large, multinational 
enterprises (MNEs)—do business in unregulated or under-regulated 
environments. In places with little or no rule of law, what can constrain 
corporate abuses? It turns out, in fact, that the lack of legal protection gives 
rise to a market for insurance—which is itself a potential source of 
regulation, albeit private rather than public. The insurance policies and 
investment guarantees that MNEs use to lower the risks that arise in weak 
regulatory environments can and do contain terms that purport to regulate 
the policies and practices of entities engaging in foreign direct investment.83 
This is not surprising considering that entities offering political risk 
insurance policies have potentially great power to set strict terms when they 
underwrite such insurance. This is particularly so with respect to polices 
issued to those seeking to invest in the weakest regulatory environments, i.e., 
those in which foreign investment and activities become especially 
vulnerable to political risks.84 The decision to invest in the absence of 
domestic regulation (and/or the ability to attract investors willing to back 
such a venture) is likely to require some security against the risk of financial 
loss in the face of the inherently significant risks that the investment will be 
negatively impacted or become a total loss. Therefore, internal corporate 
decision-makers will frequently deem investments too risky without PRI. 
Even in cases where they might be willing to proceed without it, they may 
be required to obtain it by outside investors. For instance, export credit 
agencies typically require PRI with respect to investments in which they are 
involved as a creditor and underwrite PRI policies that are tied to loans.85 
 
 83.  See supra notes 21-22 & accompanying text (describing MIGA’s ESP Standards). 
 84.  See Glossary of Terms Used in the Political Risk Insurance Industry, supra note 17 (describing 
the definition of “political risk” provided in MIGA’s “Glossary of Terms Used in the Political Risk 
Insurance Industry”). 
 85.  While the focus of this Article is on PRI underwritten by public or quasi-public entities, 
corporations frequently opt to obtain PRI in the private insurance market. Besides the public institutions, 
there are several private insurance companies that are major players in insuring private international risks. 
See id. at 103 (“By the early 1990s there were only about six major private international risks insurers: 
Lloyd’s, AIG, PanFinancial, Citicorp Trade Indemnity, and the relatively new PARIS.”). Private 
insurance companies are even harder to study than public entities such as MIGA, as they have little or no 
incentive to provide any transparency regarding their industry and practices. See BAKER & GRIFFITH, 
supra note 34, at 17 (describing how “the key data for . . .. quantitative analysis [of the insurance 
industry] . . . simply are not publicly available”). 
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Thus, the ability to secure an investment guarantee and/or PRI is frequently 
an essential pre-requisite to the decision to engage in foreign direct 
investment in the under-regulated jurisdictions where corporate social 
responsibility is viewed as particularly deficient—that is, in the very 
locations where local populations (and local natural environments) are most 
at risk of being harmed because of a lack of legal protection. 
This Part sketches the history of PRI, culminating in the fairly recent 
imposition of standards around corporate social responsibility in this type of 
insurance policy. In so doing, the Part describes the formal terms of this form 
of insurance and the way that, on paper, such policies establish frameworks 
of private regulation to fill gaps in public law. It ends by using the case study 
of political turmoil in Madagascar in 2009 to illustrate the way that PRI 
insurance policies would work if the formal terms truly set the terms of the 
relationship. This example, however, is a highly unusual scenario, as will be 
discussed further in Part III.86 
A. Historical Origins of Political Risk Insurance 
Modern political risk insurance, which provides insurance against the 
risk of expropriation of an investment as a result of various political events 
(such as war, a coup, or other politically motivated action that targets foreign 
investment), is a direct descendant of war and civil disturbance risk insurance 
that has been offered as a transnational shipping insurance product since at 
least the nineteenth century.87 War risks provisions in shipping insurance 
covered a risk inherent to transnational shipping, but at the same time these 
early insurance policies, underwritten in the emerging London global 
insurance market, “were constructed in such a way as to increase the 
incentives for [British] ship captains to avoid running high risks during a 
British conflict.”88 Specifically, as they require even today, “under the terms 
of the [standard war risks] insurance contract, the outbreak of war meant that 
all ships had to put into the nearest protected harbor and stay there until the 
conflict ended.” 89 In short, they were careful to regulate moral hazards that 
might increase the potential liability of the insurer. 
The political risk insurance product that exists today can be traced 
directly back to this shipping insurance which originated in the nineteenth 
 
 86.  The claim brought in that case was the only one brought in connection with the political unrest 
that unseated the Madagascan President, and is one of just a handful of formal claims that has ever been 
presented to MIGA during its entire thirty-year history. See infra Part III.A. 
 87.  See HAUFLER, supra note 27, at 29, 45-46.  
 88.  Id. at 47. 
 89.  Id. 
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century London insurance market.90 At that time, the British Empire stood at 
the forefront of commerce and shipped goods to and from its colonies, the 
British Isles, and other markets around the world.91 The most significant risks 
to commerce were during the shipping leg. Everything from bad weather to 
piracy to seizure by enemy naval forces put shipments at risk of being lost 
or expropriated. While commercial interests had traditionally relied solely 
upon the British Navy to accompany ships and protect at-risk shipments, they 
eventually turned to the growing insurance industry and a market for marine 
risk insurance developed.92 
At first, war risks were excluded from marine insurance.93 They were 
eventually covered when demand for coverage coincided with the increased 
ability of insurers to monitor risks and assess their likelihood of manifesting. 
Eventually, as British commercial interests shifted from a primary focus on 
shipping goods towards foreign direct investment in the early twentieth 
century, war risks insurance coverage evolved from policies covering marine 
risks inherent to shipping into policies covering similar risks inherent to 
operations involved in foreign direct investment. 94 At times, private insurers 
became skittish about continuing to offer war risks coverage (especially once 
insurance began to cover land-based risks which, unlike marine risks, could 
not be mitigated by sailing into port and taking shelter in the event of a war 
or civil disturbance).95 British authorities, concerned about the potential 
impact of cessation of commerce during wartime, stepped in to create a 
public agency to offer this type of insurance: the first export credit guarantee 
agency.96 
Although it took some time for an official public agency to emerge, the 
public and private nature of the marine insurance market was blurred from 
the start. Lloyd’s of London, in particular, developed a vast global network 
of agents to provide it with information necessary to conduct an actuarial 
assessment of global risks related to its international insurance products.97 
Thus, during the period between the two world wars, the insurance industry 
in London “maintained a unique relationship with the British Foreign 
Office” that blurred the lines between public and private.98 Both entities 
 
 90.  Id. at 29. 
 91.  Id. at 34. 
 92.  Id. at 28-29, 34. 
 93.  Id. at 45-48. 
 94.  Id. at 60-61. 
 95.  Id. at 79-81. 
 96.  Id. at 69. 
 97.  Id. at 66–67. 
 98.  Id.  
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“relied on a constant and accurate supply of information”99 relating to 
interests located around the world and “regularly exchanged information 
relevant to each other’s interests.”100 
While coverage for political risks began in the shipping context,101 these 
policies evolved to cover a broader range of risks inherent to foreign direct 
investment when British commercial interests moved away from a primarily 
import/export economy and focused increasingly on foreign direct 
investment beginning in the early twentieth century. Descended directly 
from the war risks clauses in these shipping contracts, modern political risk 
insurance has been utilized to promote foreign direct investment since before 
the beginning of the twentieth century.102 
Political risk insurance continues to be underwritten by both public and 
private insurers.103 Among the public insurers are national and export credit 
agencies (ECAs) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) of the World Bank (discussed in detail below). As of 2005, there 
were seventy-six export credit agencies operating in sixty-two countries.104 
Most are members of the Berne Union (International Union of Credit and 
Investment Insurers), which aims “to promote uniform principles for export 
credit and investment (including political risk insurance).”105 More recent 
members—“mainly from the Middle East, Eastern Europe and ‘lesser 
developed’ countries”—are grouped together in the Prague Club, a ‘pre-
membership training group’ for the Berne Union.”106 Of the dozens of ECAs, 
some of the most significant (in terms of global reach and investment 
capabilities) are two U.S. government entities: OPIC and the Ex-Im Bank.107 
ECAs are used to underwrite 10% of global exports from Northern countries, 
primarily for private sector projects.108 
 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 67. 
 101.  The war-related policies described above were the precursor to modern political risk insurance 
policies, which explicitly cover a variety of political risks.  
 102.  HAUFLER, supra note 27, at 67. 
 103.  Kausar Hamdani et al., An Overview of Political Risk Insurance, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF 
NEW YORK (2005), http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs22fedny3.pdf. 
 104.  MOODY, supra note 20, at 15. 
 105.  Id. at 15–16. 
 106.  Id. at 16. 
 107.  Id. In addition to OPIC and Ex-Im Bank, Moody identifies the following as “the eight most 
important government ECAs”: EDC, Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), Export Credit 
Guarantee Department (ECGD) (UK), Compagnie Francaise d’Assurance pour le Commerce Exterieur 
(COFACE) (France), Hermes (Germany), Istituto per I Servizio Assicuratai per il Commercio Estero 
(Italy). Id. 
 108.  Susan Hawley, Underwriting Bribery: Export Credit Agencies and Corruption, CORNER 
HOUSE BRIEFING 30 (Dec. 15, 2003), http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/underwriting-bribery. 
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B. Contemporary Political Risk Insurance Underwritten by MIGA. 
MIGA is the largest public underwriter operating in the field of political 
risk insurance. Similar to national ECAs—except that, as an inter-
governmental agency, it serves equally investors from all nations—the terms 
of the products it offers have evolved since it was originally created in 
1988.109 
Established as an affiliate of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (aka the “World Bank”), the stated objective for 
establishing MIGA was to “encourage the flow of investments for productive 
purposes among member countries, and in particular to developing member 
countries, thus supplementing the activities of the” World Bank and the 
International Finance Corporation (“IFC”) as well as “other international 
development finance institutions.”110 MIGA was created with the aim of 
fulfilling this overarching objective by, first and foremost, “issu[ing] 
guarantees, including coinsurance and reinsurance, against non-commercial 
risks in respect of [foreign direct investment].”111 Specifically, the non-
commercial risks MIGA is authorized to guarantee/insure are “political” 
risks, as is expressly spelled out in the treaty establishing the organization.112 
These include: currency transfer, expropriation, breach of contract by a host 
government, and war and civil disturbance.113 
When MIGA was organized “to complement public and private sources 
of investment insurance against non-commercial risks in developing 
countries,” its “multilateral character and joint sponsorship by developed and 
developing countries were seen as significantly enhancing confidence 
among cross-border investors.”114 During its first decade, it had no policy 
terms similar to the environmental and social performance standards that 
have subsequently been developed. These terms find their historical origins 
in the “Environmental Assessment and Disclosure Policy” that was first 
adopted in 1999 to impose environmental standards on all MIGA-insured 
projects.115 The following year, MIGA established the Office of the 
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (“CAO”) whose mission is, in its own 
words, “to address complaints by people affected by IFC/MIGA projects and 
 
 109.  See generally MIGA, THE CONVENTION ESTABLISHING THE MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT 
GUARANTEE AGENCY (2010). 
 110.  Id. at 2. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 10. 
 113.  Id. at 10–11. 
 114.  Who We Are, MIGA, http://www.miga.org/who-we-are/history/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2016). 
 115.  Id. 
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to enhance the social and environmental accountability of both 
institutions.”116 
About a decade ago, when the movement for corporate social 
responsibility (“CSR”) started becoming more mainstream, advocates began 
to lobby for the World Bank (and its affiliates, such as MIGA) to focus on 
human rights considerations as part of its decisionmaking processes.117 Such 
terms would not only be normatively desirable from the perspective of 
human rights advocates, but they would encourage practices correlated with 
reducing the harm the insurance regulates. 
MIGA has standard insurance contracts that investors may choose to 
insure the five types of political risks coverage it offers.118 These model 
contracts are available on MIGA’s website and are tailored to coverage of 
equity investments, loan guarantees, and shareholder and non-shareholder 
loans.119  Most importantly, for purposes of this Article, all “proposed 
projects [for which a MIGA guarantee is sought] that are determined to have 
moderate to high levels of environmental and/or social risk, or the potential 
for adverse environmental and/or social impacts [must] be carried out in 
accordance with the requirements of” MIGA’s Environmental and Social 
Sustainability Performance Standards (“ESP Standards”).120 
 
 116.  COMPLIANCE ADVISOR OMBUDSMAN (CAO), http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/about/ (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2016). Note that the compliance function of the CAO does not extend to the corporate 
sponsors of MIGA-backed projects. Instead, “CAO Compliance assesses how IFC and MIGA assure 
themselves of social and environmental performance at the project-level. Investigations focus on IFC or 
MIGA—not the project sponsor—and examine compliance with relevant policies, standards, guidelines, 
procedures, and conditions.” See How We Work: Compliance, CAO, http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/ 
howwework/compliance/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2016). 
 117.  See, e.g., Horta, supra note 16, at 242-43. 
 118.  These are the same risks enumerated expressly in the treaty establishing MIGA. See Investment 
Guarantees, Terms and Conditions, MIGA, http://www.miga.org/investment-guarantees/overview/ 
types-of-coverage (last visited Sept. 16, 2016). 
 119.  Id. As well, there are separate model contracts for its small investment program. See id. 
 120.  Projects, Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability, MIGA, 
https://www.miga.org/projects/environmental-and-social-sustainability (last visited Sept. 16, 2016). 
MIGA’s published guidelines state that it “categorize[s] projects based on an assessment of their likely 
environmental and social impacts” as follows:  
Category A if it may have potentially significant adverse social or environmental impacts that 
are diverse, irreversible, or unprecedented 
Category B if it may have potentially limited adverse social or environmental impacts that are 
few in number, generally site specific, largely reversible, and readily addressed through 
mitigation measures 
Category C if the project has minimal or no adverse social or environmental impacts, including 
certain financial intermediary projects with minimal or no adverse risks 
Category FI is assigned to business activities undertaken by Financial Intermediaries or through 
delivery mechanisms involving financial intermediation. 
This category is further divided into: 
FI 1: when existing or proposed portfolio expected to include substantial business activities that 
have potential significant adverse environmental or social risks or impacts that are diverse, 
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As MIGA proclaims in its elaboration of its ESP Standards: “[a]n 
important component of positive development outcomes is the 
environmental and social sustainability of projects, which [it] expect[s] to 
achieve by applying a comprehensive set of environmental and social 
performance standards.” These policies and standards, it says, have been 
“derived from our extensive experience insuring investments around the 
world” and are utilized during the underwriting stage to help it design 
specifically tailored “policies and guidelines that are applicable to a project. 
Projects are expected to comply with those policies and guidelines, as well 
as applicable local, national, and international laws.”121 
C. The Theoretical Impact of MIGA Performance Standards on Corporate 
Social Responsibility 
MIGA is perhaps the most likely of any political risk insurer to have an 
interest in promoting CSR.122 Unlike OPIC or credit guarantee agencies 
created with specific national political and policy interests as part of their 
 
irreversible, or unprecedented. 
FI 2: when existing or proposed portfolio expected to include business activities that have 
potential limited adverse environmental or social risks or impacts that are few in number, 
generally site specific, largely reversible, and readily addressed through mitigation measures; 
or includes a very limited number of business activities with potential significant adverse 
environmental or social risks or impacts that are diverse, irreversible, or unprecedented. 
FI 3: when existing or proposed portfolio expected to include business activities that 
predominantly have minimal or no adverse environmental or social impacts. 
Id. MIGA also notes that “[t]he decision with respect to classification of projects is the responsibility of 
MIGA.” Id. 
 121.  Id. The PRI contract that culminated in the successful claim for reimbursement discussed in 
Part II.C., below, contained provisions purporting to regulate the corporate policyholders’s conduct in 
Madagascar to mitigate some of the risks that manifested. Issued in 2006, the policy included the then-
applicable ESP Standards (somewhat different than those in effect today). In August 2007, the “Board of 
Directors approved new Policy and Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability 
and a new Policy of Disclosure of Information,” standards which were intended to “strengthen the 
environmental and social standards that the agency already applies to projects it supports.” News, MIGA, 
http://www.miga.org/Lists/General/CustomDisp.aspx?ID=613&ContentTypeId=0x0100A8B57A37D4
E66D42BD3171DEFD939B69 (last visited September 17, 2017). In particular, the new policies: 
[D]efine[d] MIGA’s roles and responsibilities in supporting project performance in partnership 
with clients. MIGA expects to ensure positive development outcomes relating to social and 
environmental sustainability by supporting investments that meet a comprehensive set of 
performance standards. These address social and environmental assessment and management; 
labor and working conditions; pollution prevention and abatement; community, health, safety 
and security; land acquisition and involuntary resettlement; biodiversity conservation and 
sustainable natural resources management; indigenous peoples; and cultural heritage. 
Id. The Performance Standards were updated once again in 2013. 
 122.  In large part, this Article focuses primarily on MIGA because of this. MIGA initially seemed 
like a good candidate to use as a research subject because, as a public entity, its contracts and information 
about those contracts and the contracting process were more readily available than those underwritten by 
other insurers, particularly private PRI insurers – but also many public entities. This turned out to be 
somewhat ironic given the ultimate research conclusions that MIGA should make public a lot more data 
than it currently does, see infra Part IV. 
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mandate and decisionmaking processes, MIGA is an arm of an international 
organization that has no such domestic biases to intrude on its interest in 
promoting CSR in a principled and neutral way. To the extent that such 
national credit agencies are able to regulate their own domestic corporations 
to require or incentivize CSR, policymakers may do so through other 
domestic mechanisms instead of or in addition to terms included in the credit 
guarantee agency’s contracts.123 A private insurer, on the other hand, is likely 
to be only as interested in promoting CSR to the extent doing so is 
determined to be likely beneficial to the bottom line. 
To the extent that the contracts generated by investment—including 
PRI contracts—could create an effective regulatory framework, the limits on 
public regulation that have frustrated proponents of CSR would lose their 
significance. If one looks at the contract provisions imposed by MIGA, there 
appears to be great potential for ESP Standards to play such a role. The ESP 
Standards impose private standards that could operate similarly to regulatory 
provisions included in the private contracts that are the subjects of the private 
regulatory literature discussed in Part I. 
On their face, provisions like the ESP Standards provisions that are now 
part of MIGA’s model policy reduce the potential liability that might be 
generated as a direct result of conduct undertaken in connection with the 
foreign direct investment projects being guaranteed and insured. Seemingly, 
it would be not only in the political interests of MIGA and its affiliate, the 
World Bank, to insist upon robust and effective ESP Standards. It would also 
appear to be in its financial interest to enforce them if it were in fact acting 
in a traditional insurance provider capacity. Per the terms of its guarantee 
contracts, MIGA stands to lose substantial sums should political risks 
manifest that trigger claims under these types of contracts. 
D. Madagascar: A Political Risk Case Study 
A situation that arose out of political unrest in Madagascar a decade 
ago, before the stricter ESP Standards that are now a standard part of the 
MIGA model policy, illustrates the way that political risks can materialize 
and lead to claims by investors. It also shows how the presence of investor 
corporations in politically unstable environments without strong public law 
 
 123.  Of course, policymakers at domestic credit guarantee agencies may decide that there are 
particular reasons to require socially responsible corporate practices in connection with a loan guarantee 
that other domestic regulators might not decide should be more generally applicable to all domestic 
corporations. As discussed above, requiring those engaging in direct investment to engage in socially 
responsible business practices may be a financially savvy decision by the guarantor since such business 
practices may lessen the risk of a political risk manifesting, at least in some instances. 
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regulations can be linked to, and exacerbate, the political risks that can then 
manifest in damage to foreign investments in these environments. 
In 2009, Madagascar experienced a dramatic political upheaval when 
incumbent President Marc Ravalomanana was overthrown in a coup d’état 
orchestrated by Andry Rajoelina, the former mayor of Antananarivo, the 
Madagascan capital. Rajoelina utilized skills he had learned working as a 
teenaged disc jockey to broadcast radio addresses criticizing the ruling 
regime. One of the major themes underlying his criticism concerned the 
ruling government’s commitment to investment projects by foreign 
corporations, such as Daewoo, the South Korean conglomerate that was 
granted a 99-year lease of more “than 1.3 million hectares of arable land in 
order to plant corn to be exported back to South Korea.”124 Investments such 
as this one were widely perceived to benefit the elite members of 
Madagascan society at the expense of the majority.125 
Popular support for the ruling government had already been eroding by 
the time that large-scale protests began in early 2009 after Rajoelina ramped 
up his criticism.126 The protests led to the deployment of security forces to 
suppress demonstrations near government buildings. The result was the 
deaths of hundreds of protestors. Eventually, in March 2009, after the head 
of the army was ousted and replaced by a Rajoelina supporter, Rajoelina was 
able to wrest control of the government. This extra-constitutional military 
coup was condemned by the African Union, as well as by the United States 
and the European Union.127 
 
 124. AMNESTY INT’L, MADAGASCAR: URGENT NEED FOR JUSTICE 7 (2010), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/36000/afr350012010en.pdf (“The announcement of this 
project created an atmosphere of distrust among the population, who suspected the government of selling 
off Malagasy land under conditions that lacked transparency.”). 
 125.  Tom Burgis & Javier Blas, Madagascar Scraps Daewoo Farm Deal, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 
18, 2009), https://www.ft.com/content/7e133310-13ba-11de-9e32-0000779fd2ac. The Daewoo deal was, 
at least “[i]n theory, . . . a win-win deal: Daewoo would pay Madagascar $6 billion to grow corn and oil 
palm, helping South Korea meet both its food-security and bio-fuels needs, while providing Madagascar 
with revenues and desperately needed jobs.” Scott Baldauf, Hunger and Food Security: Is Africa Selling 
the Farm?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 6, 2011), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-
Issues/2011/0206/Hunger-and-food-security-Is-Africa-selling-the-farm. But most of the local populace 
did not view it this way. The political protests that led to Ravalomanana’s ouster, and Rajoelina’s 
installation as head of state, “showed that the Madagascan people—70 percent of whom live in rural areas 
and nearly 50 percent of whom suffer chronic malnutrition—saw the deal as a ‘land grab’ and a threat to 
their country’s survival.” Id. The skeptical view of most Madagascans was shared by at least one 
European diplomat who opined when the deal was first announced that “[w]e suspect there will be very 
limited direct benefits [for Madagascar]. Extractive projects have very little spill-over to a broader 
industriali[z]ation.” Song Jung-a & Christopher Oliver, Daewoo to Cultivate Madagascar Land for Free, 
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2008) https://www.ft.com/content/6e894c6a-b65c-11dd-89dd-0000779fd18c. 
 126.  AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 124, at 7–9. 
 127.  Id. at 8–10.  
QUINN FOR PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2018  8:31 PM 
352 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 28:327 
Following his installation as President, Rajoelina moved quickly to 
cancel contracts with foreign investors. One of his very first acts was the 
cancellation of the unpopular Daewoo contract.128 
Other impacted investors were apparently surprised by the coup’s 
similar effects on their investments. In the same year that Rajoelina assumed 
power, Australian-British metals and mining conglomerate Rio Tinto (the 
largest foreign investor in Madagascar) issued a statement that “it foresaw 
no problems for its titanium mining operation and license” despite the regime 
change129—only to see its mining contracts frozen just a short while later, 
with President Rajoelina announcing that his “administration was reviewing 
all contracts with foreign investors because the country was receiving too 
little revenue.”130 
The coup—the result of local disapproval of foreign direct 
investment—is a classic example of the type of political risk that makes 
many foreign investments financially precarious. It is to guard against 
precisely the types of risks that manifested in Madagascar that foreign 
investments in tumultuous political environments are often guaranteed or 
insured by PRI.131  Not long before the 2009 coup, for instance, Louvre 
International, a Mauritius corporation, had obtained a PRI guarantee of $2.2 
million (USD) from MIGA “to cover its equity investment in Grand Hotel 
du Louvre of Madagascar” for a variety of risks including “war and civil 
disturbance.”132 Following damages to its investment resulting from the civil 
disturbances leading up to the coup, MIGA paid out the claim lodged by 
Louvre under the guarantee. 
The same political instability in Madagascar that necessitated PRI also 
created other risks and harms that public regulation often attempts to prevent. 
For example, in a report titled “Madagascar: Urgent Need for Justice,” 
Amnesty International detailed how “[t]he political transition from the 
government of [the ousted Ravalomanana regime] to the [regime of 
President Rajoelina] was characterized by violence, often accompanied by 
human rights violations.”133 Violence continued after the regime change, 
 
 128.  Burgis & Blas, supra note 125. 
 129.  Eric Onstad, Rio Expects No Problems from New Madagascar Government, REUTERS (Mar. 
18, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-madagascar-crisis-riotinto-sb/rio-expects-no-problems-
from-new-madagascar-government-idUKTRE52H2SZ20090318. 
 130. Madagascar Says Mining Contracts Will Be Reviewed, REUTERS, Mar. 30, 2009, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLU47467. 
 131.  HAUFLER, supra note 27, at 41. 
 132.  Project Brief, Grand Hotel du Louvre, SA, supra note 21. 
 133. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 119, at 9.  
QUINN FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2018  8:31 PM 
2018] REGULATION IN THE SHADOW OF PRIVATE LAW 353 
with supporters of the ousted government becoming the new victims of state-
sanctioned violence.134 
The unstable political environment also had a devastating impact on 
Madagascar’s precarious natural environment. “While illegal logging had 
been going on for years, the pace . . . suddenly escalated [after the collapse 
of Madagascar’s government in 2009]: The forest was unpoliced and filled 
with organized gangs, a free-for-all of deforestation.”135 More generally, 
“[j]ust as the global environmental community rejoiced in 2002 when Marc 
Ravalomanana assumed the presidency on a green-friendly platform, so did 
they react with dismay in the spring of 2009 as the military routed 
Ravalomanana from office.”136 The escalating deforestation rate has also had 
a serious impact on plant and animal species that are endemic to 
Madagascar.137 Perhaps the most famous endemic species—the lemur—has 
seen its numbers dwindle significantly since Rajoelina assumed power.138 
More than 90% of native lemur species are now endangered, with scientists 
pointing to the 2009 political turmoil as “a flashpoint” that dramatically 
worsened the situation for the species.139 
These risks to individuals and to the environment arose from the same 
shaky political environment as the risk to foreign investments in Madagascar 
at the time. Public regulations—either domestic or via public international 
law—are unlikely to be effective (or potentially feasible) mechanisms for 
managing risks under such circumstances. But even as the investments 
themselves potentially exacerbate the risks with which investors are 
concerned, the investment risk is potentially subject to private regulation. 
 
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Robert Draper, Madagascar’s Pierced Heart, NAT’L GEO. (Sept. 2010), 
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2010/09/madagascar/draper-text. Additional risks to the local 
population are also connected to the environmental disaster that is unfolding. One rosewood looter 
recounted to National Geographic the dangers of the illegal timber trade, noting as an example that “two 
men were decapitated with a machete over a timber dispute” shortly before the looter was interviewed. 
Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  KAREN FREUDENBERGER, USAID, PARADISE LOST?  LESSONS FROM 25 YEARS OF USAID 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS IN MADAGASCAR v (2010), 
http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/paradise_lost_25years_env_programs.pdf 
(“And where there is illegal logging, there are other illegal activities. Threatened animals, including 
several particularly endangered species of rare lemurs and tortoises, are being captured for export and for 
food at rates that ensure their extinction in the wild, unless this trend can be reversed.”). 
 138.  Id. at 88. 
 139.  Cristoph Schwitzer et al., Averting Lemur Extinctions Amid Madagascar’s Political Crisis, 343 
SCI. 842, 842–43 (2014) (noting, e.g., that, as of 2014, “94% of lemur species are threatened, up from 
74% in 2008” and describing various reasons why lemur populations declined rapidly after the 2009 
political turmoil); see also Michelle Douglas, The Future of Madagascar’s Lemurs, BBC (Feb. 27, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20150226-what-hope-is-there-for-madagascars-threatened-lemurs. 
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While political turmoil undercuts the ability of domestic legal regulation to 
serve as a check on the legal risks to the investment—or on the investors 
themselves—the involvement of MIGA and/or other public or private 
insurance companies in foreign direct investments in environments like 
Madagascar means there is space for regulation of at least the investor’s own 
conduct in these politically volatile jurisdictions. 
This is significant for several reasons. First, as was explicitly clear in 
the Madagascan situation, tensions over foreign direct investment often 
contribute to political instability and contribute to the risks being insured. To 
the extent that the conduct of insured investors can be regulated to reduce 
the same political risks they are seeking to insure against, everyone wins. 
Second, whatever the potential benefits, promoting investment by 
corporations in politically unstable environments generates other risks that 
are attendant to the low levels of public regulation of corporations in such 
environments. These risks—that corporations will not behave in a socially 
responsible manner vis-à-vis the local population and environment in such 
jurisdictions—contribute to political instability that may be triggered by 
popular dissatisfaction with corporate policies and practices, and have often 
seemed to be a seemingly insoluble regulatory puzzle.140 
The PRI contract under which Louvre made a successful claim for 
reimbursement did contain some provisions purporting to regulate Louvre’s 
conduct in Madagascar to mitigate some of the risks that manifested—but 
the obligations imposed were minimal. For instance, MIGA touted that the 
project would benefit the local population by generating new jobs for local 
citizens.141 In fact, the estimated number of new jobs to be created was a 
mere thirty-five142—hardly a boon likely to offset the perceived negative 
impact of a refurbished four-star hotel that would presumably benefit 
directly only elite Malagasy and foreign business interests. 
Even if the terms of the policies could be crafted more appropriately—
an achievement that reforms to the ESP Standard model provisions that post-
date the Louvre policy purportedly now claim—a single policy like the one 
issued to Louvre could hardly be expected to do much work. But, 
significantly, MIGA (and the World Bank more generally) had underwritten 
guarantees and insurance with respect to a great deal more foreign 
 
 140.  A large and significant literature has emerged on the subject of corporate social responsibility. 
As discussed supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text, a significant thread has explored the potential of 
private regulation. Despite this interest in private regulatory solutions in the context of supply chain 
contracts, there is a lack of attention in the scholarly literature to the regulatory potential of other types 
of contracts relating to foreign direct investment. 
 141.  Project Brief, Grand Hotel du Louvre, SA, supra note 21. 
 142.  Id. 
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investment in Madagascar that was impacted by the 2009 political turmoil.143 
If enforced, the terms of multiple policies across investment sectors—and 
particularly if there were ones involving large investors—might have had 
some impact. 
But unlike the Louvre claim, details of which MIGA has made publicly 
available, what actions may have been taken by MIGA or investors who were 
covered by other policies, is not evident. The more significant story about 
MIGA’s insurance of political risk in Madagascar may be the one that lies 
behind a wall of silence. 
III. BEYOND FORMAL CONTRACT TERMS 
While MIGA was established with the express purpose to underwrite 
guarantees and insure political risks that arise in connection with foreign 
direct investment, it often acts less like a traditional insurer than one would 
expect based on the formal terms of their contracts with investors. Claims 
like Louvre’s described above are outliers. In general, such claims are almost 
never brought. Although formally operating as an “insurer,” MIGA is 
arguably not providing political risk insurance so much as it is providing its 
services as a mediator/enforcer of the property rights of investors/insureds. 
Yet, while the relationship forged between MIGA and its policyholders 
turns out to be quite different than the formal terms reflect, MIGA continues 
to possess potential as a strong regulator. The reason that investors pay 
MIGA significant sums for this form of “insurance” reflects the reality that 
it may possess the ability to exert even greater regulatory power—over both 
investors and host governments—than is evident on the face of its contracts. 
This Part explains what services MIGA in fact provides to its 
policyholders under the label of “insurance,” and the significant regulatory 
power it may wield over those with whom it has established contractual 
relationships. Whether it chooses to exercise its significant authority in favor 
of demanding greater corporate social responsibility is a harder question to 
answer given the lack of available data, an issue the next Part addresses in 
detail. 
A. MIGA “Insurance” Contracts in Action 
While acting as a guarantor for risky foreign investments, MIGA does 
not act much like an arms-length insurance company. Although it takes in 
 
 143.  See, e.g., Onstad, supra note 124 (discussing World Bank’s position that the mining contracts 
with Rio Tinto should not be renegotiated by the new government); Schwitzer, supra note 139, at 842 
(discussing World Bank’s foreign aid to Madagascar which continued to be offered to the new 
government even as the United States and the European Union suspended aid until a democratic 
government was re-installed). 
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substantial sums in premiums,144 MIGA almost never has to pay out in 
connection with formal insurance claims. To date, it has paid only eight 
claims since it came into existence as an entity in 1988.145 This is in contrast 
to other insurers of political risk. For instance, “[b]etween 1995 and 2001 the 
British ECGD regularly paid out more than twice (in some instances up to 
three times) as much in claims as it had ostensibly received in premium 
payments.”146 
Yet, MIGA’s numbers are misleading if they are taken to suggest that 
claims are unlikely to arise. The small number of claims paid by MIGA over 
the past three decades is a testament to the agency’s ability to work with 
investors and host countries to find amicable resolutions to disputes than it 
is to the rarity with which claims—or disputes that might lead to them—
arise. 
MIGA focuses on finding solutions to disputes before they reach the 
level of a full-fledged claim. Ultimately, MIGA’s goal is to keep the 
investment and its development benefits on track. On its website, MIGA 
promotes its ability to serve as a dispute resolution provider, proclaiming: 
In order to prevent a potential claims situation from escalating, MIGA 
provides dispute resolution services to all of its clients. MIGA maintains 
close contact with investors and monitors projects and potential issues so 
that the Agency can respond at the first sign of trouble to facilitate 
resolution of potential investment disputes.147 
Even more to the point, MIGA advertises to its potential insureds that 
it has “immediate access to officials at the highest levels of government in 
the countries for which MIGA provides guarantees and its status as a member 
of the World Bank Group significantly strengthens MIGA’s ability to resolve 
potential disputes to the satisfaction of all parties and deters some 
 
 144.  In 2016, MIGA’s net premium income was $86.4 million. See MIGA, MANAGEMENT’S 
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 6 (2016) 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25109/MIGA_Financial_Statements_20
16.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y. This net total represents gross premiums of $139.8 million minus 
amounts paid out to reinsure some of its risk (plus ceding costs minus other costs such as brokerage and 
other commissions). Id.; see also id. at 5. 
 145. MIGA, MIGA: HELPING KEEP SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENTS ON TRACK 1 (2015),  
https://www.miga.org/documents/Dispute_Resolution_and_Claims.pdf. Of course, it is also true that 
MIGA has never denied a claim (at least as of 2010). Louis Bedoucha, Risk Assessment and Mitigation 
in Infrastructure Projects, OECD, at 11, Feb. 18, 2010, http://www.oecd.org/mena/investment/ 
privatesectorinitiatives/44667907.pdf. While this presumably remains the case, the author has not located 
any reliable source to support MIGA’s assertion that it has still never denied a claim. 
 146.  MOODY, supra note 20, at 17. Note that the British EGCD was able to do so because of its 
reliance “on counter-guarantees from the countries which imported the underwritten goods and services.” 
Id. MIGA’s own practices may be similar—it may well be warding off claims by promoting settlements 
directly from host governments in cases where investments are threatened or negatively impacted. 
 147.  Id. 
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government actions that otherwise could disrupt guaranteed investments.”148 
MIGA reports that as of October 2015, its “proactive facilitation efforts have 
been pivotal in the resolution of nearly 100 project-related disputes since the 
Agency’s founding in 1988.”149 Its success in “facilitating” resolutions 
without claims means that MIGA takes in significant amounts of money in 
premiums, but very rarely has to pay out in return. “To date, MIGA has been 
able to resolve disputes that would have led to claims in all but two cases, 
and both of those claims were paid. MIGA also has paid six claims resulting 
from damage related to war and civil disturbance.”150 
Indeed, within the industry it is known that PRI insurers often have 
considerable influence with foreign governments that are targeted to host 
investment projects.151 Thus, the risk mitigation benefits offered by PRI go 
well beyond the ability of investors to obtain financial indemnification in the 
event of a loss. MIGA’s “ability to shield investors from loss” is well known 
and provides “a ‘halo effect’ associated with their policies.”152  As one 
industry analyst says, 
Examples of [the “halo effect”] are the exemptions from currency controls 
that were granted to certain investors during the Russian and Argentine 
crises. In the latter crisis, this exemption was extended to clients of all 
members of the Berne Union (which includes public and private insurers). 
The halo effect can also be useful in facilitating the salvage of assets ceded 
to the insurer after a loss has been paid.153 
Precisely because of this “halo effect,” obtaining a guarantee or insurance 
policy from MIGA provides credibility that helps investors to obtain 
financing.154 
Thus, unlike insurance discussed in other literatures,155 political risk 
insurance in general—and that underwritten by public entities like MIGA 
most particularly—is unlikely to exert much if any regulatory influence 
based on the threat of non-payment owing to an arguable breach of an ESP 
Standard. Rather, the way in which the insurance is actually used (to obtain 
 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Hamdani, supra note 103. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id.  
 154.  MOODY, supra note 20, at 9. Because of its impact on obtaining financing, one commentator 
believes that “[a]ny influence the World Bank or OPIC might have exerted to forestall [negative] 
consequences [of an investment] could only have come from their refusing insurance at the outset.” Id. 
As discussed below, this is not necessarily the case, as investors who know they will work informally 
with MIGA to resolve disputes that might arise are likely to continue to have incentives to be cooperative.  
 155.  See, e.g., Vanderbergh, supra note 8 (environmental); Talesh, supra note 62 (employment); 
BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 34 (directors and officers insurance). 
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financing and to obtain the good influence of the World Bank in relation to 
host governments), along with the very low probability of a claim arising, 
means that most investors are likely to assess the risk of non-payment based 
on a breach of an ESP Standard as a very low probability and make decisions 
based on other considerations. In this sense, such clauses are unlikely to carry 
much regulatory weight based on their status as formal contract obligations. 
B. MIGA’s Regulatory “Practice” 
The fact that insureds are unlikely to be concerned about the financial 
consequences of breaching the contract terms and risking non-payment of a 
future claim does not mean that MIGA’s contracts are without regulatory 
impact. To the contrary, its contract relationships may still provide 
considerable space for regulation of corporate policies and practices, albeit 
not via the more traditional contract theory considered above. 
Instead, MIGA has the capacity to exert considerable influence over 
corporate practices at the contracting stage. Its ability to refuse insurance if 
applicants fail to meet the standards MIGA sets in connection with individual 
projects gives it considerable power and regulatory authority over practices 
related to project-specific ESP Standards.156 
In exercising this authority, MIGA could (and claims that it does) 
undertake to conduct comprehensive due diligence of corporate practices and 
policies. MIGA also claims to routinely conduct a detailed examination of a 
project’s local impact and to survey the local constituencies to determine 
what ESP Standards would benefit local interests and forestall or minimize 
political risks from later manifesting. In practice, of course, due diligence 
may be more or less thorough. Whether it is effective will depend on many 
things—including but not limited to: the types of policies MIGA 
implements; the internal culture regarding compliance with the policies; 
openness to changes to policies intended to benefit local interests; the skills 
and devotion of the individuals conducting the investigations; and how those 
individuals are supervised. 
Thus, even in making decisions about whether to enter contracts, MIGA 
has the capability to exercise significant regulatory authority in the field of 
corporate social responsibility (among others). But whether it, or other 
public entities that facilitate foreign direct investment, will make corporate 
social responsibility a priority in their contracting decisions is far from clear, 
notwithstanding the words MIGA uses in its own internal policies or in the 
 
 156.  MOODY, supra note 20, at 9 (“Any influence the World Bank or OPIC might have exerted to 
forestall these consequences [of an investment] could only have come from their refusing insurance at 
the outset.”). 
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policies it writes when it decides to accept an application and insure against 
the political risk involved.157 
But perhaps more significantly, after the contractual relationship 
commences, ongoing interactions between MIGA and the investors with 
whom it contracts may be regulatory in nature. To be sure, it is true that 
claims are not likely to be rejected based on an alleged breach of an ESP 
Standard because claims are not likely to be formally brought at all—or to 
be rejected even in the highly unlikely event that they are. But, there are 
significant numbers of cases in which potential claims arise and are dealt 
with informally. 
As described above, more than one hundred different disputes between 
investors and host countries have been resolved through MIGA’s offices.158 
Because insureds depend on MIGA to assist them in resolving claims, they 
have incentives to cooperate with MIGA and remain in formal good 
standing—and in its informal good graces. 
Indeed, it is possible for enforcement to occur during a policy term 
based on environmental/social responsibility breaches or violations. In 1995, 
OPIC (the U.S. domestic counterpart to MIGA) canceled $100 million in 
PRI cover for Freeport-Rio Tinto’s Grasberg mine, and in 1997 an OPIC 
lawyer produced compelling environmental arguments against Rio Tinto’s 
Lihir gold venture after citing a breach by Freeport-Rio of the U.S. Foreign 
Assistance Act.159 
But whether this is common practice for entities such as OPIC or MIGA 
is far from clear. On the one hand, it appears that such enforcement is not 
typical. One OPIC alumnus who has now built a private insurance practice 
asserts that private risk insurance is increasingly drawing clients in large part 
because private insurers can be “nimbler” as a result of not having “to 
prepare 800 politically mandated labor, environmental, and workplace 
studies”—i.e., like the ESP Standard plans now mandated by MIGA (and 
OPIC) “before taking action.”160 
 
 157.  Even corporations with highly publicized accusations of human rights abuses have been able 
to secure PRI from public entities. In 2003, OPIC gave Unocal $350 million in PRI for the company’s 
West Seno (Indonesia) offshore oil and gas exploration project – despite the fact that dozens of NGOs, 
headed by the Environmental Defense Fund, had argued that the proposed project “appear[ed] to be in 
violation of Indonesia’s environmental law[s]” and that there were “strong indications of serious . . . 
human rights abuses associated with the project.” MOODY, supra note 20, at 18 (citing Titi Soentoro & 
Stephanie Fried, Case Study: Export Credit Agency Finance in Indonesia (2002)). 
 158.  MIGA, supra note 138; see also notes 137–40 & accompanying text. 
 159.  MOODY, supra note 20, at 18 (citing MINING J. (London) (Nov. 10, 1995), FIN. TIMES (London) 
(Nov. 8 1995); OPIC, Environmental Summary of Lihir Gold Project (Washington, DC) (Aug. 8, 1997)). 
 160.  Rosenblum, supra note 23, at 34 (quoting Robert E Svensk). 
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On the other hand, private insurance is more likely to be offered (and 
utilized) in lower risk investment situations. “[P]rivate insurers are said to 
‘cherry-pick’ the more desirable risks and underwrite them at lower prices 
than the public benchmark.”161 Thus, it is possible that significant regulation 
can occur, and indeed may be occurring, as a result of the type of contracting 
relationship MIGA is creating with its insureds. Unfortunately, it is not clear. 
What is clear is only that the terms of the contracts themselves tell us 
precious little about the true nature and scope of the regulatory relationship. 
IV. THE NEED FOR GREATER TRANSPARENCY IN PRIVATE 
REGULATION 
The emphasis in scholarship (and practice) is often—perhaps too 
often—on formal written documents. As one sociologist notes in considering 
the way in which De Beers’ CSR policies have been implemented by its 
supply chain partners, CSR “Best Practices and Principles” are often 
constructed and conceived “not as a process or a practice, but as a material 
object: a set of written documents.”162 Unfortunately, this tendency to rely 
on written documents misses crucial aspects of the relationships they create 
or are intended to facilitate. For instance, De Beers’ top-down 
implementation of its CSR policy “by the book” caused it to miss out on 
integrating crucial internal cultural norms that would have made the policy 
more likely to be successful.163 
Likewise, understanding how MIGA engages with its regulatory 
subjects164 is critical to understanding whether it is in fact successful in 
implementing its own CSR standards—and if not, why not. In short, 
mapping out a successful regulatory story requires incorporating information 
beyond that found on the written contract page. 
 
 161.  Hamdani, supra note 103, at 5. Self-insurance may also become more attractive to investors 
who decide that CSR requirements imposed by insurers are too onerous. A lot of the initial interest in PRI 
is by investors who: 
[T]est the PRI market as a part of a due diligence process. For example, the availability of 
insurance at a reasonable price might confirm the investor’s internal risk assessment of the 
project. However, the tendency of investors to go forward with emerging market investments 
without PRI also suggests that PRI coverage, while beneficial, is not essential to many 
investment decisions. Indeed, one market participant noted that PRI tends to be cut when a risk 
management budget is under pressure. 
Id. at 7. 
 162.  Jamie Cross, Detachment as a Corporate Ethic: Materializing CSR in the Diamond Supply 
Chain, 60 FOCAAL 34, 41 (2011). 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  By regulatory subjects, I mainly have in mind the corporate entities to which it issues guarantees 
and PRI, but the host governments are also MIGA’s potential regulatory subjects. 
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The difficulty with this from a scholarly perspective is that determining 
the impact of private contract regulation—much less developing a formal 
approach to improve it—is far more difficult when one moves beyond formal 
texts. In undertaking this project, for example, MIGA was a natural choice 
to study for a number of reasons. But perhaps none was as compelling as the 
fact that it is a public institution that appears to be relatively transparent, with 
much accessible data. It has an extensive website detailing its policies, 
procedures, and model contracts.165 The website contains detailed 
information regarding the studies it conducts relating to the projects with 
which it is associated.166 On its face, it appears to be an easy subject about 
which to conduct empirical research. 
However, what appeared to be significant transparency turned out, in 
this case, to fall well short of full disclosure. Obtaining information about 
much of the post-contract conduct and relationships in which MIGA is 
engaged was not possible. While an outside or internal audit could reveal 
more about the organization and its culture, it would require interviews and 
in-depth investigation beyond what appears on the pages of MIGA’s 
contracts. While the words on the paper that describe what an organization 
is and what it does are important, the lived experience on the ground is too. 
In on-going business relationships, the formal legal remedies available 
—those that structure the law of contracts and form the basic common law 
principles every first-year law student is taught—are frequently not very 
important. Recognizing that parties involved in on-going business 
relationships typically prefer to permit cure in cases of breach, rather than to 
terminate and/or bring lawsuits, the Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods is structured around default presumptions reflecting that reality.167 In 
many cases, the rules established by a contract are expected to be invoked in 
rare cases, such as in the event of a truly dire event, but otherwise will be 
ignored in favor of what is working day to day. 
In other areas, as well, “[e]fforts to examine the broader landscape of 
informal relational forms [beyond the four corners of the contract 
relationship] generally have progressed further on a conceptual than an 
empirical basis.”168 Empirical research that requires information not easily 
gleaned from existing documents can be extremely difficult to conduct. 
 
 165.  See generally MIGA, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, World Bank Group, 
https://www.miga.org/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2017). 
 166.  See id. 
 167.  See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 97/98, reprinted in S. Treaty Doc. No. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 Fed. Register 6262, 6264–80. 
 168.  Beth Gazley, Beyond the Contract: The Scope and Nature of Informal Government-Nonprofit 
Partnerships, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 141, 142 (2008). 
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Private insurance companies are notoriously difficult to study because of the 
confidential nature of the industry.169 
Although MIGA is a public entity and, to its credit, makes a great deal 
of information publicly available, there are some significant gaps. These 
make it difficult to assess its regulatory relationships with its insureds and 
the host country governments. There are at least three ways in which MIGA 
compiles information about post-contract relationships. Each is explored 
below, with discussion of how much of a deficiency currently exists, as well 
as how and to what extent the deficiency could be alleviated. 
A. Transparency Regarding MIGA’s Dispute Resolution “Service” 
One area in which MIGA could substantially increase transparency 
regarding its role as regulator vis-à-vis its contracting relationships is in its 
handling of its dispute resolution “services.” This is potentially the easiest 
area about which MIGA could collect, compile, and publish data beyond 
what it currently provides. 
Recently, MIGA has begun to provide more information regarding its 
handling of pre-claim disputes—which it describes as “dispute resolution” 
services. As described above, MIGA now advertises the fact that it provides 
a forum to resolve disputes that arise in connection with the projects it 
guarantees. While it does not explicitly sell its authority and ability to 
persuade host governments to change behavior that threatens insureds’ 
investments, it no longer obscures the reality that this may be the “product” 
that is actually desired by those who pay substantial insurance premiums.170 
Indeed, on its website, MIGA now touts as the first two “side” benefits of its 
insurance policies: (1) its “status as a member of the World Bank Group and 
its relationship with shareholder governments [that] provides [it with] 
additional leverage [over governments] in protecting investments” and (2) 
 
 169.  See Tom Baker, Transparency Through Insurance: Mandates Dominate Discretion, in 
CONFIDENTIALITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND THE U.S. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 186  (Doherty et al. eds., 
2012) (noting that “[t]he liability insurance industry has a long history of providing information to civil 
justice researchers” but “[a]t the same time, . . . the liability industry has a long history of refusing to 
provide information to civil justice researchers”); id. (“Granting researchers access to insurance company 
data is a public service that is unlikely to provide any private benefit to the company that provides the 
access”); see also BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 34 (“The lack of transparency in most accounts of 
corporate D&O insurance limits data and defeats empirical study.”) (quote on back cover by Prof. Donald 
Langevoort, Georgetown University Law School); Paul Sullivan, Scrutinizing the Elite, Whether They 
Like It or Not, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/16/your-
money/16wealth.html (“When we study the poor, it’s relatively easy. . . . The poor don’t have the power 
to say no. Elites don’t grant us interviews. They don’t let us hang out at their country clubs.” (quoting 
Columbia University sociologist Sudhir Venkatesh)). 
 170.  See MIGA, supra note 144 (describing MIGA’s gross and net premium income from 2016 
which was $139.8 million and $86.4 million respectively). 
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its willingness and ability to act as “an honest broker, [which] intervenes at 
the first sign of trouble to resolve potential investment disputes before they 
reach claim status.”171 
Despite advertising dispute resolution as a distinct feature and benefit, 
MIGA still does not provide a good deal of data regarding its “dispute 
resolution” services. On its website, it provides some information about three 
example disputes it helped to resolve, but notes that the “[c]ompany and 
country names are used with permission or drawn from public sources.”172 
The implication is that making all information public about each claim that 
enters the dispute resolution stage might be problematic in light of the fact 
that parties to a dispute may desire some measure of confidentiality. In fact, 
this confidentiality might in some cases be critical to settlement occurring.173 
Still, MIGA could track and publish a good deal of data regarding 
claims it helps resolve without breaching confidentiality. MIGA notes that 
“nearly 100 project-related disputes” have been resolved “since the 
Agency’s founding in 1988.”174 This is approximately one dispute for every 
seven projects it underwrites.175 
Related to these one hundred or so disputes are likely to be reams of 
data that could be de-linked from the project and host country. Just by way 
of example,176 MIGA could report on how many disputes arise by industry, 
region, and/or scale of project. It could report how far along a project was 
before the dispute arose, how long after it first arose that dispute resolution 
with MIGA’s involvement began, whether MIGA or another party initiated 
the dispute resolution, and how long a claim took to resolve. It could also 
report in far more detail regarding its own process for handling disputes—
including even what it classifies as a “dispute” and what it means by “dispute 
 
 171.  Investment Guarantees, Overview, MIGA, https://www.miga.org/investment-guarantees (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2017). 
 172.  MIGA, MIGA: HELPING KEEP SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENTS ON TRACK (2015),.  
 173.  Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit 
of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 304 n. 91 (1999) (stating that “[c]onfidentiality proponents 
virtually all assume that confidentiality is critical to the settlement of many lawsuits”); Richard L. Marcus, 
The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 469–70 (1991); Arthur R. Miller, 
Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 429 (1991) 
(arguing that confidentiality is “not only acceptable, but essential” to settlement of lawsuits). 
 174.  MIGA: HELPING KEEP SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENTS ON TRACK, supra note 172.  
 175.  Id. (noting that over 700 policies have been underwritten to date). Of course, the way that MIGA 
has worded it does not make clear whether a single project may encompass multiple disputes. Thus, 
disputes may arise even less frequently than the 1/7 figure noted above. 
 176.  I do not purport to know precisely what data categories might make the most sense for MIGA 
to identify. To a large extent it depends upon the nature of the dispute resolution process, the parameters 
of which (as noted above) are not defined clearly by MIGA in its discussion of its dispute resolution 
“service.” 
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resolution,” neither of which it defines in any way. Most importantly, for 
purposes of determining MIGA’s regulatory impact on CSR, MIGA could 
report data relating to disputes in respect of a project’s ESP Standards. For 
instance: how often are the disputes it helps resolve directly related to those 
standards and their implantation? Does MIGA ever require insureds to 
undertake additional measures that are not required by the ESP Standards? 
Does MIGA ever relax the ESP Standards or even, perhaps, direct an insured 
not to follow them?177 
B. Additional Transparency of the Office of the Compliance Advisor/ 
Ombudsman (CAO) 
Data regarding dispute resolution would not only be relatively easy to 
collect, but also the most likely to reveal significant regulatory behavior by 
MIGA. One would expect MIGA to exert more regulatory pressure over both 
policyholders and host governments during periods when it is actively 
attempting to encourage them to settle disputes and prevent claims for which 
MIGA could become liable. The data published by the Office of the 
Compliance Advisor and Ombudsman (“CAO”) in connection with 
complaints brought by people affected by MIGA-guaranteed projects shows 
that more data collection and reporting is clearly possible. 
MIGA publicizes information relating to complaints that are made to its 
CAO. The “CAO’s mission is to address complaints by people affected by 
IFC/MIGA projects and to enhance the social and environmental 
accountability of both institutions.”178 
It fulfills this mission in several ways: First, through its role as 
Ombudsman, in which capacity it fields and resolves complaints by 
individuals or community members affected by a project “to help resolve 
grievances about the social and environmental impacts of IFC/MIGA 
projects.”179 Here, the CAO provides significant data. This is the one area in 
 
 177.  By “relaxing” the ESP Standards, I do not mean formally in the sense that a new standard would 
become a part of a written contract. Instead, I mean such things as MIGA’s ignoring violations it becomes 
aware of or informally communicating to an insured or a host government that it will do so. In terms of 
directing an insured not to follow the Standards, I am imagining situations where, for some reason, the 
host government may object to them based on how they are being implemented or how such 
implementation is being perceived by its citizens. But one could imagine other scenarios that could also 
prompt such a direction from MIGA. 
 178.  See About the CAO, CAO, http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2017). 
 179.  See How We Work, CAO, http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/howwework/ (last visited Sept. 22, 
2017). The CAO notes that its “[d]ispute resolution processes typically involve approaches common to 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR), including mediation, joint fact-finding, information sharing and 
facilitated dialogue.” Id. 
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which MIGA makes public a fair amount of detailed post-contract 
information. 
With respect to its Ombudsman role, the CAO investigates all claims 
brought by affected individuals or community members who raise a social 
and environmental issue about a MIGA project.180 Significantly, the CAO 
publishes synopses of all cases that it investigates. The website links to 
reports of all CAO cases (organized by region).181 These report details of the 
claims, the investigation, and the recommendations made by the CAO.182 
The CAO also fulfills its mission through its role as Compliance 
Auditor. In this capacity, the CAO conducts audits to assess how “MIGA 
assure[s] [it]self of social and environmental performance at the project-
level.” To be clear, such audits are not aimed at examining whether or not an 
insured has itself engaged in misconduct but instead “focus on” MIGA’s 
“compliance with relevant policies, standards, guidelines, procedures, and 
conditions.”183 However, despite the fact that the focus of audits is MIGA 
itself, as an entity, and whether it adequately followed its underwriting and 
risk management due diligence, report recommendations typically include 
steps that MIGA can take to regulate particular projects more effectively 
going forward—as well as make changes in its policies and practices to 
ensure more robust regulation at earlier stages in future projects.184 This 
 
 180.  Three explicit requirements that must be met in order to be eligible for dispute resolution by 
the CAO Ombudsman: 1) complaints must “raise[] social and environmental issues”; 2) be “filed by an 
individual and/or community directly affected by the project”; and 3) relate to a MIGA project. See How 
We Work: Ombudsman, CAO, http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/howwework/ombudsman (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2017). 
 181.  See CAO Cases, CAO, http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2017). 
 182.  Just as one recent example, see, e.g., Guatemala/CIFI-01/Santa Cruz, CAO, http://www.cao-
ombudsman.org/cases/case_detail.aspx?id=241 (last visited Sept. 22, 2017). In this case, a group of 
community representatives from Santa Cruz, Guatemala, filed a complaint alleging that underwriting of 
the “project was never properly consulted with [impacted] communities and that community members’ 
opposition to the project has been met with violence and repression on the part of the company and the 
government.” The investigation resulted in a referral to the CAO’s compliance arm, and ultimately to a 
full-blown audit. Id. 
 183.  Thus, for example, the Dikulushi Copper-Silver Mining Project Audit was triggered by a 
request from then-World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz to analyze the adequacy of the due diligence in 
which MIGA engaged when it approved  a project in the Democratic Republic of the Congro (DRC) 
during the same time period as the due diligence was conducted. The DRC received logistical support 
from the insured to reestablish control over a town that had been taken over by a small rebel group, during 
the course of which “the armed forces of the DRC allegedly killed civilians, including by summary 
execution, looted, and carried out other crimes including extortion and illegal detention.” See CAO, CAO 
AUDIT OF MIGA’S DUE DILIGENCE OF THE DIKULUSHI COPPER-SILVER MINING PROJECT IN THE 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, FINAL REPORT i (2005), www.cao-
ombudsman.org/cases/document-links/documents/DikulushiDRCfinalversion02-01-06.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2017).  
 184.  See id. at ii. 
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provides some indirect evidence that MIGA does in fact take steps after the 
initial contracting stage to work with and regulate the conduct of those 
engaged in the projects it guarantees. But as discussed below, after the 
Report is issued following a complaint process within the CAO–that is, once 
the audit report is produced and the project is once again operating in a 
“dispute free” zone—we again find little or no data regarding MIGA’s 
practices generally or with respect to what specific actions it undertakes to 
persuade its policyholders to engage in socially responsible behaviors. 
CAO data is the most extensive post-contracting data MIGA currently 
provides. It strongly indicates that MIGA regulates beyond the four corners 
of its contracts in the post-contracting phase. Yet, because CAO audits are 
backwards-looking only, and typically arise in connection with alleged 
misconduct, they do not demonstrate whether MIGA monitors or regulates 
its run-of-the-mill, routine insureds—or even what regulatory actions MIGA 
takes following recommendations from the CAO.185 
C. Lack of Transparency Regarding MIGA’s Post-Contracting 
Relationships When There Is No Ongoing Dispute or Complaint 
The CAO reports, detailed as they are, appear to be the sole exception 
to a lack of transparency and information regarding what happens between 
MIGA and its insureds after a contract is in place. The “Access to 
Information” section of MIGA’s website mainly focuses on disclosure of 
information before or at the “time of contract signature.”186 
In full, the “Access to Information” section of the website identifies six 
categories of information that it provides to the public. These are (1) Project 
Information, (2) Summaries of Proposed Guarantees (SPGs), (3) Project 
Briefs, (4) Environmental and Social Review Summaries, (5) Institutional 
Information, and (6) Access to Information Requests.187 
Of these, there is no information at all provided about the first category 
(Project Information).188 The next three categories specifically state that the 
information provided is either pre-contract (in the case of SPGs) or from the 
time of contract signing (Project Briefs and ESRSs). Institutional 
information is information about MIGA itself, including its by-laws, 
 
 185.  Only in instances where the CAO were to conduct a subsequent audit, following a new 
complaint about the same project, would follow-on actions end up being reported. 
 186. Access to Information, MIGA, https://www.miga.org/Projects/Access-to-Information (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2017). 
 187.  Id.  
 188.  Under the first heading—”Project Information”—there is only blank space, with nothing 
currently on the website in this section. It is not clear what type of information MIGA provides or what 
it intends to say about this category. 
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standard contracts, and financial statements. The information provided under 
this part of the website does not include any mention of its relationships with 
insureds other than the formal model contract documents. 
The only information in this section that may relate to the post-contract 
stage is the last category: “Access to Information Requests.” Under this 
heading, the website states that “[i]ndividuals looking for specific 
information not available on MIGA’s website may submit a disclosure 
request.”189 However, the website itself does not explain the standards it uses 
to evaluate such requests or what types of information it will disclose in 
response to information disclosure decisions. 
 * * * 
Although MIGA appears committed to transparency and provides a 
substantial amount of information about its processes, there is a significant 
lack of data and information about MIGA and its relationship with investors 
from the point in time that a contract is signed. However, the exception to 
this—CAO Reports that detail investigations and audits—is very 
encouraging insofar as it demonstrates not only the capacity for monitoring 
and data collection, but the actual publication of detailed information about 
projects that MIGA underwrites and guarantees. Unfortunately, the CAO 
Reports do not provide much information about the specific post-contract 
interactions between MIGA and its insureds. At best, the recommendations 
they make suggest that such interactions are occurring and that MIGA has 
the capacity to engage with its insureds in an ongoing regulatory capacity 
during the contract relationship. 
Ideally, going forward, MIGA would continue its trajectory towards 
more transparency. It should begin to publish information regarding the 
dispute resolution process itself and what happens when it acts to mediate 
disputes between host countries and investors, as well as data regarding those 
disputes. In addition, publicizing what happens to CAO recommendations 
and what steps MIGA takes to implement them would go a long way to 
revealing how MIGA regulates in practice. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite lawyers’ preference to rely on text, a contract’s formal terms, 
negotiated prospectively, actually represent only the starting point of a 
relationship between the parties. The real-life terms to which that 
relationship will ultimately conform may differ. Particularly in situations 
where the parties are engaged in an ongoing relationship and unlikely to test 
the contract by invoking it to claim damages, informal arrangements or 
 
 189.  Access to Information, supra note 185. 
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decisions to depart from the formal terms of the contract may be a frequent 
occurrence. The stronger party in the contractual relationship might decide 
to exert its regulatory authority in ways not anticipated at the time the 
contract was negotiated. It might even direct the other party not to comply 
with contractual obligations.190 
Unfortunately, this makes it difficult to measure the regulatory impact 
of private contracts. Without data about the contracting parties’ relationship 
during the term of the contract, we cannot draw conclusions with any degree 
of certainty. What appears to be non-regulation when measured against 
formal contract terms only may in fact be the strong regulation of one party 
by another. To understand private regulation, we need to understand the true 
nature of the relationship forged between private contracting entities. 
More information about contractual relationships is therefore necessary 
to analyze to what extent private contracting can become a fruitful 
mechanism for regulating corporations. Its potential is likely to extend 
beyond the written words contracting parties use to create their relationship. 
Those words frequently will not capture the relationship’s true contours. The 
true potential of contracting to fill public regulatory gaps will remain a 
mystery as long as these regulatory relationships continue to live in the 
shadows of private regulation. 
Political risk insurance is a case in point. This form of insurance is 
theoretically able to bolster the regulation of corporate social responsibility 
in under-regulated jurisdictions. There has been an encouraging rise in the 
imposition of formal requirements on corporations that are obtaining 
guarantees and insurance for projects that pose political risk. Yet, it is unclear 
whether political risk insurers are fulfilling their regulatory potential. While 
one can map the increase in formal contract terms designed to foster more 
socially and environmentally responsible practices by investor corporations, 
further study is needed to determine in what ways MIGA may be applying 
pressure to ensure that policyholders engage in socially responsible behavior 
in relation to their foreign investment projects. 
MIGA has recently made significant progress in enhancing its 
commitment to promoting socially and environmentally responsible business 
practices. It could make substantially more by increasing transparency of its 
 
 190.  It might elect to do so for a number of reasons. Depending on the reason, and what alternative 
action is ordered, the goal underlying the obligation might still be furthered. If the obligation is costly, 
both parties may effectively agree to ignore the obligation without necessarily amending the contract to 
reflect that it no longer remains a formal requirement. Similarly, specific circumstances may arise that 
make clear the goal of the contract will be more likely to be realized if resources that might be used to 
ensure compliance are allocated in other ways. These new allocations may well be dictated by the party 
that had imposed the obligation that was later left by the wayside.  
QUINN FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2018  8:31 PM 
2018] REGULATION IN THE SHADOW OF PRIVATE LAW 369 
practices after the initial contracting stage. It would be groundbreaking were 
MIGA to implement a policy of collecting detailed information after it issues 
guarantees or agrees to underwrite political risk insurance policies. This 
practice would increase transparency regarding guaranteed and insured 
projects. The potential benefits to contracting institutions and scholars would 
be significant. 
 
